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                            ABSTRAC[I]
    This work deals wkh the intra-day determinat!on of foreign exchange
rates. We havetwo objectlves. The first is to suggest a microstructure model
of the foreigR exchange markets. The second is to explain certaln empirica}
issues, usiRg this model.
    Auctions iit foreign exchaRge markets are coRtinuous and double-sided.
In a continuous aziction,there is no specific length of time durlng which quan-
tities of demand and sLipply are defined. Therefoye, we model random arrivals
of buyers and sellers as Poisson processes and define per-unit-time expected
number of arrivals (arriva} intensity) of buyers or sellers. In a double-sided
auction, buyers (sellers) compete w2th other buyers (sellers). This competi-
tion coraplicates a trader's decision process. We circumvent this difflculty by
adopting the concept of arriva} intensities.
i
    Our model combines an individual agent's optirnization problem wlth an
auction setting, which models interactlons among heterogeneous ageRts. By
solving the agent's optimization problem, we show the first local extyemum
(FLE) of the expected time path of the exchange rate, not any ether local
extrema, determines an ageRt's current actlon.
    Since agents' actions depend on their expected FLE values, the distribu-
tion of the expected FLE values among the agents iRdicates the distributien
of actions. KeyRes' metaphor, which compares the problem of predicting asset
pi'ices to guessing the winner of a beauty contest, can be applied to estimating
the distribiit!on of the expected FLE valties.
    In the second part o£ the model, by taking agents' heterogeneous expec-
tations into coRsideration, we derive the formula for £he expected time path of
the exchange rate with given val"es for arrival intensities of retail traBsactions.
In the course of finding the formula, the effects of two demand and supply
components, namely heterogeReous expectatioBs and retail transactioRs, are
identified.
    This distinctieR of effects is £hen applied to explain, for example, the
positive re}ationshlp between volatility and trading volume, which has been
empirically de£ected in eq£iity markets but Rot !n foreign exchange markets.
The model also suggests that the degree of heterogenelty of expectatlons affects
the bld-ask spread.
?
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              TERMS, SYMBOLS AND ASSUMPTIONS
                            TERMS
AGGREGATE RETAIL DEMAND AND SUPPYY: sums of all the agent's
R!(t) and R2(t).
ARRrvAL: If an agent quotes his price or if he notifies the broker of his
intention to trade at the price being quoted by someone else, we call such an
event or the agent himself an arrival.
ARRIVAL INTENSITY: The expected number of the arrival per unit tirne is
called ihe arrival intensity.
BANKRUPTCY AVOIDANCE: Thls is a criterion such that an agent always
maintains the prebability o£ bankruptcy be}ow a given level. In ether werds,
the agent does not speculate, ifthe probability of catastrophic loss exceeds the
given level.
BEARISH, BULLISH: An agent is called bearish (bnllish) at epoch to ifE(t)
has an interval [te,7b] sttch that dC,(,t) <O ( de,(,t) > O) for tE [to,[Zb].
EPOCH: A point on a time axis ls called an epoch.
CONTINUOUS AUCTION: The continuous auction implies (1) buyers and
sellers may quote their respective prices at any epoch, (2) whenever a buyer
and seller pair agree upon the price, a transactlon takes place, and (3) upon
the completion of the traRsaction, the buyer and seller pair Ieave the market
and the bldding is continued among the remaining traders and new entrants.
Foy the con£imious auction, there is not a specific length of time duriRg which
quantities of demand ancl supply are defined.
DAYUGHT LIMIT: The maximttm magnitudes of the open positioR which
are allowe(l during the business day. The dayllght limit is exogeRously given
to the agent by his banl<.
                                v
FLE: The first }ocal extremuiR of the agent's expected time path of the ex-
change rate.
MARKET MAKERS: Agents who quote both buyiRg aBd selling prices at the
same tlme.
MARKET RATES: Bid rate and offered rate together are called the market
raies.
OVERNIGHT LIMIT: The restriction on the open positioR at the end of the
bRsiness day is called everuight limit. [rhis is s£ricter than the daylight limit.
POSITION: We cali the agent's level ofinventory his position and zeyo inventory
level a square position. A Aonzero iRventory is called an open position.
RESILIENCY OF MARKET: A market has resilieRcy if temporary price
changes due to temporary order imbalances qvtickly attract new orders to the
market. (Schwartz, 1988)
SpECIALIST: A member of a stock exchange who maintains a fair aRd orderly
market in one or more securkies; buying or selling for the specialist's own
account to counteract temporary imbalances in supply and demand. (John
Downes and Jordan El}lot Goodman, Dictionary of Finance and ihvestment [Ibrms,
Barron's, 1985 )
STATE OF THE CRYSTAL GLASS: If the agent is iR the state of the crystal
glass, he is confident enough of his expectation to speculate based on it.
STATE OF [VHE FROSTED GLASS: If the agent is in £he state of the frosted
glass, he does not want to assume an open position. This is becanse if the
agent has the open position, there is a substantlai possibility that an adverse
shift of the exchange rate will ixcur loss to the agent.
STATIONARY liETEROGENEITY: A si£uation where distribu£ion functions
Ht(x) ancl Gt(x) coincicle.
                                 vi
TRANSITION 1: An agent's level of confidence in his own expectation moves
from the state of the frosted glass to the state of the crystal glass.
TRANSITION 2: An agent loses confidence in his expectation. This is a
transition from the state of the crystal glass to the state of the frosted glass.
IIrhe agent waBts to square his positioR afld he becomes a buyer or seller,
depending on his position at that moment.
                           SYMBOLS
 {ti, t2]: A closed interval between epoch ti and t2.
   A(t): The minimum selllng prices which are beiRg quoted in the market
        at epoch t.
 AH(t): The aggregate heterogeneity transactions AH(t) mean excess trans-
        actioR quantity of buyers over sellers who hit the market rates due
        to heterogeneous expectatioRs.
 AR(t): The aggregate retail transactions. AR(t) iii ARD(t)-ARS(t) and
        E[AR(t)l = (Aai - Abi)t'
ARD(t): The aggregate retai} demand (ageRts' selling to customers). This is
        a c"mu}ative value over an iRterval [o,t].
ARs(t): ']]he aggregate retail supply (agents' buying from the customers).
        1['his is a cumulative value over [O,t].
   B(t): The maximurn buying p!'ices which are being quoted in the market
        at epoch t
 ED(t): r]]heexcess clemand at epocht; ED(t)=-AR(t)+AU(t).
   f},: Information which the agent has at epoch te. The expectation is
        conditional on the information obtained by epoch to, JP},.
    N: A tota} number of agents in thi$ economy which is given exogenously.
                               vi}
Nc(t)
Nf (t)
Ri(t)
R2(t)
 s(t)
Si (t)
S2 (t)
s,* (t)
Zi (t)
Z2 (t)
zf (t)
z(t)
z*(t)
: Number of agents who stay in the crystal glass at epoch t. This is a
  random variable and N :N, + Nf･
  Number of agents who stay in the frosted glass at epoch t.
  Cumulative quantity purchased from custorners during [o,t].
  Cumulative quaAtity sold to customers during [o,t] .
  Price at which the Iast transactioR was made before, and at epoch t.
  TraBsaction price at which an agent sells at epoch t.
  Transaction price at which alt agent buys at epoch t.
  A desired valute for Si(t) for i --- 1,2.
  Cumulative quantity purchased from the market duriRg [O,t].
  Cumulative quantity sold to the market during [O,t]. If dZi(t) and
  dZ2(t) are not zero, they are quantities which agent bought and sold
  in the market at epoch t.
  Desired values of Zi(t) for i-- 1,2 .
  [l]he ageRt's position at epoch t. Z(t) :-= Zi(t) - Z2(t)+ zo + Ri(t)- R2(t)
  where zQ is an inkial value of Z(t) at epoch o. Z(t) ls a random variable
  and it takes va}ues fyom a fiRite subset of integers, for examp}e,
  {-IO,-9,...,O,1,...,9,IO}.
: DesiredvalueofZ(t). ;]]heageRtcancontrolZ(t)byincreasiRgZi(t)or
  Z2(t) but ait iRstaAtaReous adjttstment of Zi(t) or Z2(t) is not always
  posslble. The desired value of Z(t) becomes the agent's decision
  variable, depending on what action the ageitt takes. The constTaints
  are imposed oll Z"(t).
viii
X(t): A value of FLE for an agent who has Transition 1 at epoch t. It is
       assumed that when the agent determines the value for FLE, it is a
       random drawiRg according to at(x) .
 y(t): Middle poiBt of the market rates at epoch t. This is a random
       variable.
Gt(x) DistyibutionfuRctioRfromwhichthenewanival'sX(t)isdrawn.
"t(x) fft(x)isasampledistributionfunctionofx(t)ofagentswhoexistin
       the market at epoch t.
   ai: Arrival intens!ty of retail transactions. The expected number of
       arrivals of retail customers per unk £ime.
   rsi: Compoundarrivalintensltyofretailtransactions. fii=aiE[C]==
       Jl Ri(t)dt for i-- l,2. 'I[`he expected qualltity of the retall traRs-
       actlons per umt tlme.
    r: A set of feasib}e actions.
   Vh: A subset of actions whlch is feasible when an agent sets his position
       at a desired level, hitting the market rate right away.
   r.: A subset of actions which is feaslble when an agent sets his quotation
       at a desired level, waiting for his quotation to be hit.
   A.: An arrival intensity of buyers who hit the offeredl rate. A. iif Aai +Aa2
  A.i: An arrival iBtensky of b"yers who hit the offered rate dtte to the
       retail selliRg.
  A.2: An arrival intensity of buyers who hit the offered rate due to the
       heterogeneous expectations.
   Ab: An arrival lntensity of sellers who hit the bicl ra£e. Ab =- Abi + Ab2.
lx
   Abi: AR arrlval intensity of sellers who hit the bid rate due to retail buy-
        ing.
   Ab2: An arrival intensity of sellers who hk the bid rate due to heteroge-
        neous expectations.
   st,: A finite subset of posltive integers whose elemeRt is a value which
        the exchange rate may take. The exchange rate is the price of US
        dollars in terms ofthe local currency. For tke sake of simplicity, the
        actual exchange rates wkh decimal points are redefined to positive
        integers. For example, sti == {i,2,..., 200}.
   stg: A finke subset of non-negative integers, including O, who$e elements
        are values which cumulative quantities of retail and wholesale trans-
        actioRs of the agent may take.
ff[O,to] Anagent'sprofitover[O,to].
   6(t) ExpectedvakieofY(t)conditlonaloninforrRationavailableatagiven
        epoch, say, to. g(t) ix E[Y(t) l1lt,]
  e.(t) Expectedofferedrateatepocht.
  Cb(t) Expectedbidrateatepocht.
 ei, e2 : Parameters for ghe exponential distributions. fi(t) :eiexp(-eit) and
        fe(t) xx e2 exp(-e2t) are density functions for the length of time which
        indlvidua} ageBts stay in the frosted-glass and the crystal-glass state
        respectively.
                         ASSUMPTIONS
A(4-1):Atepocht,aretai}sel}ingpriceis A(t)+c andaretai}buying
        pricels B(t)-c,wherecisanexogenouslygivenconstant.
x
A(4 - 2)
A(4 - 3)
A(4 - 4)
A(4 - 5)
A(4 - 6)
A(4 - 7)
A(4 - 8)
A(4 - 9)
: Arrivals of retall buyers and sellers constitute respective compound
 Poisson processes.
 The daylight limit is L.
 The overnight llmit is O.
 Individual local markets around the world have their specific business
 hours. The start and the end of the business hours of a local mar-
 ket overlap with neighboring local markets. Sorne of the agents have
 branches in the neighboring local markets. At the end ofthe business
 day, some of the agents who have the overseas branches remains as
 rrtarket maker. If thelr positioRs are open wheR the transactions in
 our local market are completed, these market makers have transac-
 tions with theiy branches. The prSces applied for these inter-branch
 transactions are the same as the market rates at the last epoch. If
 the market maker ends with a shoyt (long) position, he buys from
 (sells to) the overseas branch at the last effered (bid) rate of ov{r
 local market.
: When the agent calculates hls expected profit, the set of values which
 S;(t) and S,' (t) can take at given epoch t in the futttre consists of 6.(t)
 and 6b(t) oRly.
 e(t) is Rot infiuencecl by F.
 'I he ageRt is risk fieutral.
 ']]he agent expects £ha£ the exchange Tate will go up more than the
 bid ask spread. The agent's expectatloR is as fol}ows: At epoch to,
 thereisallinterval[to,7blsuchthat dCit)>o forto<t<7'band
 Cb(T) > 6a(to)･
xi
A(4 - lo): When the effered rate is hit, the bid and offered rates jump upward
         by O, v or 2v with equal probabilities while maintaining the bid and
         ask spread at v.
A(4-11):Iftheagenthasabullishexpectationsuchthatfore<t<T, f!{E!}>
         o and lg(T)-C(O)l>2u,thelttheageRtchooses{k}.
A(4 - 12): The agent does not expect the exchaRge rate to move more than
         the bid ask spread for a while: At epoch to, there exists &n interval
         [to,[rb]suchthat dC,(,t)=o or f!{il,glpto but k(T)-g(te)l<2u.
A(4 - 10) Each arrival trades either one or two units.
 A(6-1) The LraitsitioR between the two states is a renewal process whose
         renewal epochs follow exponential distributloRs.
 A(6 - 2): The quantity of each arrlval is unity.
 A(6 - 3): Each agent's dayligh£ limit is equa} to oRe transaction unit.
 A(6 - 4): Ht(x) and Gt(x) are not equal.
A(6 -4)': Gt(x) aRd Ht(x) are the same distrlbutioits.
 A(6 - 5): Gt(x) and Ht(x) are unlform distributions; Gt(x) = f,H,(x) :iXfL xsixm
 A(6 - 6): Alkhe agents kave the same bid-ask spread.
 A(7 - 1): All the ageRts make the same estimate about the variance of Gt(x)
         and Ht(x) and E[N.].
 A(7 - 2): The aggregate retail demand and supply have the same arrival rates;
         Aal = '>`bl '
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1PARM.
1. INTRODUCTION
    This work deals with the intra-day determination of foreign exchange
rates. We have two objectives. The first is to establish a beachhead in the
analysis ofthe microstruct2Lre of the foreign exchange market. The mlcrostruc-
ture consis£s of studies about detai}s of £ransaction processes. This subject has
been researched for equity markets. However, only a few modelsi have been
suggested for the microstructgTe of the foreigR exchange markets. The models
for the equity markets are not directly applicable to £he foreign exchaRge mar-
1<et, becattse the equity market ls essentially a retail market while the foreign
exchange market is a wholesale market. The existing models for the foreigR
exchange market do not consider interactlons between the wholesalers.
    Emplrica}ly macroeconomic models are Bot better at approxiraating the
foreign exchange rate than a raltdom wa}k hypothesis. Our motivation to study
the rnicrostructure of the foreigR exchange market stems from the fact no one
has yet investigated whether lnclividual traders' optirnizatlons iR the market
are conslstent with macroecoRomlc models. Our mode} shows that optimiziRg
traders try to exploit any fiuctuation of the transactlon price Bo matter what
    iSee A}len (1977) and GarmaR (1976). Garman (1976) is applicable al-
though not specialized iR the foreigR exchange market.
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factor is causing the fiuctuation, including misunderstandings of other agents.
It implies that there are not enough stabiliziRg forces iR the market to bring
the exchange rate to a level determined by macroeconomic factors.
    The exchange rate is determined by continuous and double-sided auc-
tion. Sttch an auction coRstitutes a process of price formation in continuous
time, which is also a process of dissemination of information iit a speculative
market. The continuous auction is a subject which is inherently incompatlble
with comparative s£atics equilihrium aRalysis. Studying the auction process
of the foreign exchaRge market necessari}y prompts a theoretical challenge.
We introduce a queueiltg-theoretic approach. Name}y, instead of demand and
sttpply per period, we defiRe expected numbers of arrivals of buyers and sellers
per unit time. With this novel approach as a main feature of our beachhead
model, we specify an agent's optimization problem and develop a model of the
auction amoRg heterogeneotts agents.
    The second objective of thls paper is the application of o"r model to
empirical issues. Us!Bg oiir modei, we explain empirical observatioRs, incl"d-
IBg £he relationship between the size of bid-ask spread and price vo}atility.
As a further application, we expand our model by allowing some agents to
maRipulate the market although there are many ageitts in the market. Then
we suggest that we can construct a model such that Stackelberg behaviors of
some agents can cause bandwagon effects2 among the agents. So far the band-
wagon effects in the foyeigB exchange market have been taken as psychological
phenomena by academicians such as Baillie and McMahon (1989).
    2rl'his is clescribed in SectioR 3･8･
                                                                  3
    The following are the empirical observations which we want to explain
with ouy model: (1) Exchaitge rate volatility is ait impoytant factor in ex--
plaining variatioits in bid-ask spread (Glassman, 1987). (2) The relationship
betweeR the bid-ask spread aRd trading volume is sometimes positive and often
statistically insignificant (Glassman, 1987). (3) A clear relationship between
volatility and trading volume does not exist,judging from (1) and (2). On the
contrary, in the eqRlty market, a positive corre}atioR between trading volume
and the absolute valiies of price change exists (Karpoff, 1987). (4) Bandwagon
effects appear sometimes. (5) A sequence of transaction prices shows a trend.
    Figure 1 summarizes the structure of the foreign exchange market of
our model. We cal} forelgn exchange traders of banks agents. The market
is a wholesale market and ks constitueRts are one broker aRd many agents
connected by telephone. Spot US dol}ars are traded against another currency
and the bidding takes place with a broker during business hours. The market
is located iR one cottntry and has speclfic business hours. There exist overseas
markets whose business hours may or may not overlap with our local market.
Interactions with overseas markets are left imp}icit ln this work as we focus on
our local market.
    AII agents contlnuously moRltor the bidding, but not all of them are
quoting their buyiRg or sel}ing prices. If an agent quo£es his price to the
broker, or if he notifies the broker abogt his intention to trade at the price
being quoted by someone else, we call such an event, or the agent himself,
an arrival. The agents arrive at the mayket as buyers or sel}ers and leave
tke market wheR their transactions are realized or when they caRcel theiy
quotations. The broker anRounces to the market the maximum buying price
and the miRimum selling price among the va}id quotations.
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    Our model consists of two parts, firstly, aR individua1 agent's optimiza-
tion problem with a given expectation about transaction prices and, secondly,
auction which is interactions among heterogeneous ageRts. The agent's opti-
mization problem is expected profit maximization with a giveR expectation.
In our setup, the agent trades in the market and meaRwhile he trades with
randomly arriviRg retail customers. In addition, the auction is continRous aRd
dottble-sided. The doub}e-sided auction complicates the agent's optimization
problem by offering various choices to the agent. There are too many alter-
native actions and the probabilities for the consequences which each choice of
act!on may bring are intractable. Therefore, we so}ve the optimization prob-
lem by limiting the set of feaslble choices for the agent to a restricted set. As
a conclttsion of the individual agent's optimizatlon problem, we show how the
fust Iocal extremum (FLE) of the expected time path of the exchange rate
deteymines the agent's action Row.
    In the secoRd part of the model, optlmizing ageRts interact in the auction
process. They are assumed to be heterogeReous with respect to the expectation
of an intra-clay time path of the exchange rate and a}so with yespect £o retail
transactions. Since ageitts' actions depend on their expected FLE values, the
distribution ofthe expected FLE values is the distributioR ofthe actions. The
quantlty which an agent wants to trade is also trea£ed as a random variable.
The heterogeneous ageRts coRstittite a statistical ensemble (Garman (i976)).
Taking the heterogeneity of the agents into account, we derive the expected
time path of the exchange rate and the market maker's optimal quotations
which have beeR takeA as glven in the individua} agent's optlmization problem.
in the course of the cleriva£ion of the expectatlons, effects of two sources of
arrivals, heterogeneous expectations and retail txaxxsactiens are ideRtified. We
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use our model to prove propositions about the empirical issues. and present
our analysis as proofs for propositions.
2. FEATURES OF THE MODEL
                  2.1. TKEORETICAL FEArliURES
    The continuous dottble-sided auction in the foreigR exchange market can-
not be modeled with comparative statics. In addition, as in other financial
markets, wheR traclers form expectat2ons aboiit the exchange rate, they take
into account what expectations other traders have. Estimates of others' expec-
tatioRs determine the traders' actions and, hence, the traRsaction prices. These
interactions of expectatioBs, which Keynes compared to guessing a winner of
the beau£y contest, have no£ been IRcorporated in£o microstructEtre mode}s.
To establish a beachhead in the analysis of the microstructure of foreign ex-
change maykets, we need analytical method which have not been app}ied in
this context. Our model coRtains the fol}owing features: arrival intensities
of the buyers and sellers; heterogeneity of information; a pyocess of revisiRg
expectations; Po!sson arrival processes of the retail customers; agents acting
as super KeynesiaR; a market maker behavlor that depends on expectation.
    The auction in the foreign exchange market is continuous and dottb}e-
sided. The continuozis auction implies (1) buyers and se}lers may quote thelr
respective prices at any epoch; (2) whenevey a buyer ancl seller pair agrees upon
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a price, a traRsaction takes place, aRd; (3) upon completion ofthe transaction,
the buyer aitd seller pair leaves ehe market, afid the bidding is continued among
the remaining traders and Rew entrants. For the continuous auction, there is
no specific lengtk of time duriRg which quantities of demand and supply are
defined. Instead of demand and sripply, we model random arrivals of buyers
and sellers as Poisson processes and we defille per-unit-time arrival rates of
buyers and sellers. The expected number of aryivals per unit time is called the
arrival intensity. Thls describes the fust feature of our model.
    The seconcl feature deals with how to measuring £he heterogeReity of
agents. Since our model is in continuous time, agents form expectatioRs for
continuous time paths, instead of exchange rates of the end of discrete periods.
Agents are heterogeneous in regard to the expected time path. Along the ex-
pected time path, not every point is equally important for the agent's decision
making. As is argiied in the discttssioR abont the agent's optimizatioR prob-
lem, only the first local extremitm (FLE) ofthe expected tlme path matters for
an agent's preseRt transaction decisions. We assign a distrlbution function to
the val"es of FLE expected by the ageRts. Definlng a distribution functioR for
the expected FLE values is the second feature of ouy model. r]]his distribut!on
function refiects the percentage of the agents sharing a glven expected FLE
value and, hence, £he percentage of the agents who will take the same actlons.
    The £hircl feature of our model is that the agent yevises expectations over
time. We assume tlkat £he ageRt's leve} of confidence shifts between two states,
w}kich we call state of crystal glass and state offi'osted glass, respectlvely. If
the agent is in a crystal-g}ass state, he is coRfident eBoiagh of his expectation
to speculate on it. If the agent is in a frosted glass state, he {tloes Rot want to
assume an ope}i position. When the transltion from the crystal glass to the
                                                                  7
frosted glass occurs, the agent loses confidence iR his expectation and wants to
square his position. He becomes a buyer or seller, depending oR his position
at that mement. Wheit the traRsition is from frosted te crystal, the agent
becomes buyer, seller or market maker, depending on his new expectation.
    We add a fkirther specification to these transitions of expectations. We
assume that for each state the lengths of time the ageRt stays in this state
can be described by an expollentlal distrlbution. In other words, we model
state traltsitions as a renewal pyocess of switching between two states, where
renewal times fol}ow the exponential distribution asslgned to the respective
state. These expec£ation transitions explain why agents arrive at tke market
asynchroBously. In peractice, not everyoRe is quoting his prlces nor having open
positioR ag aRy given time. With this formal model of revising expectations,
we can differeittiate volatile perlods from quiet periods by changing parameter
values of the renewal process.
    Agents tyade with retail customers who are merchaRts and investors. ']rhe
fourth featvtre of our mode} is that the randem arrivals ofthese retail c"stomers
are assumed to constitute Poisson pyocesses whlch are exogenously given to
the agent. WheRever £he retai} customer arrives, the agent trades with the
customer and the ageRt's posieion changes. Then the ageRt may want £o adjust
his positio}i by trading iik the mayket. The randora ayrival of retail customers
provides aRother reason for agents to arylve asynchronous}y. By specifying
retai} demand and sgpply as Poisson processes, we can explicitly derive their
expected quantities for a given lnterva} of t!me. Also Poisson processes have
the conveRient property that the sum of Polsson processes is also a Poisson
process whose arrival intensity is the sum of the intensi£les of the individual
processes. Therefore, when we aggregate the individtial ageRts' retail demand
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aRd supply, the aggregated quantitles also constitute Poisson process. [l)he
expected valttes for the aggyegate retail demaRd and supply can be obtained
and used in the analysis.
    The fifth £eature of our model is super Keynesian. A sequeBce of the
transaction prices is deteymined by the individual agents' perception about
what the t:ansaction prices will be. Foymation of the expectation about fu-
tkire spot rate invo}ves estimating the other ageRts' expectations. Ind!vidual
agents' tran$action decislons are based oR sitch estimates. KeyRes's aRalogy
of guessing a winRer for a beauty contest app}ies here. Everybody is Iooking
arouRd and trying to guess what others are £hinking about the future path of
the exchange rate. In thls sekse, the agents in our model caR be called s2Lper
Keynesian.3 As long as one can take advantage of the other agents' expecta-
tions, it does not matter whether their expectations match your forecast. Our
super Keynesian agents estimate the dlstrlbution function of expected FLE
values, so they caR take advantage of the heterogenelty of the expectations.
    The sixth feature of our modeHs that agents' decisioB to act as market
makers clepends on their expected FLE values. If an agent's FLE ecluals the
cm'reBt traiisa,ction prices, the agent becomes the market maker. In other
words, if the agent expects that the transaction price will remaiR arottnd the
current level, his optimal action is quoting both btiying and selling prices at the
sarae time, in order £o take advantage ofthe different expectations among the
ageRts. [rhe bid-ask spread will become his profi£ as the traRsactions continue.
r]]he sixth feature is Rot an assumptloR but a logical coRsequence ofour mode}.
    3This term is colned by Dona}d Schilling.
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          2.2. TRADING MECHANISMS TO BE MODELED
    Our model's assumptioRs are based on a realistic trading mech&nism. In
the following, we present the assumptions and ouy rationale for them. In our
model, the local market has a broker and all auctions take place with the
broker. The agents, who are banks, may assume open positions depending on
theiy expectatioRs on the time path of the exchaRge rate. The agent's cost of
the open position, i.e., the cost of helding nonzero inven£ory, is zere, except
for an overnight open positioR. "])raitsactions with overseas banks and forward
transactlons are implicit ln our model. The overseas banks enter our model
as retail cuseomers of o"r agents. The forward market ls e}iminated from the
analysis. Interest rates in US do}}ars and our local cuyrency are exogenous}y
glven.
    In the actgal foyeign exchaRge market, there are two methods by which
banks bid and trade. The fust method is akictions throiigh brokers. Thesecond
is direct dealings between baRks. In the Tokyo market, 50% ofthe traRsactEons
are through the brokers (Takahashi, 1989) and in New York, 30% are through
broker$. In both methods, delivery of spot currenc!es is done two business
days after tlke conk'act. Therefore, the open position during the business day
does not incuy cost to the agent.
    In the case of auctiofts through brokers, banks are coimected to brokers
by telephone. When £hey want to trade, banks notify the broker of their
cluotatlons aRd some additioma1 information. Among these quotations, the
broker announces to the market the maximum buylng price aRd the minimum
se}}ing price. Names of b=yers aRd sellers are withheld. When a buyer and
seller palr agrees upon the price, the £ransactlon takes place.
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    The other method to bidding aBd trading !s direct deaiings between
banks. A bank inqulres of another baRk its quotatlons (both bid and asked
rates) and if the !nquiring bank wants to £rade at one of the quotations, a
transaction takes place. Dlrect dealings are done only between banks which
have contracted to do so bila£erally. TraRsaction take place in units of 10 mil-
lion US dollars while in the byoker's market most of the transactioRs are 3 to
5 million US dollars. When a banl< inquires about another bank's quotations,
as a matter of priitciple, theiRquired bank does not refuse to quote. What can
the iitqu!red bank do, if it does not want to buy (or sell) axxy more because of
its position or expectation? It quotes a less competitlve buying (selling) price
and a more competkive selling (buying) price, relative to the other banks' quo-
tations. }Iowever, this strategy does not always work. EveR if the quotation
is less competitive, some inqulylng banks still may sell (buy) US dollars to the
inquired bank iR order to foi'ce it to have the longer (shorter) position than the
inquired bank waRts. The reason of the inquiTing baRk's action is that as an
antagonist ofthe inquired bank the inquiring bank is wlshing that the inquired
bank wozdd start selling (buying) a large quaRtity so the transaction price will
fall (rise). If the inquiriRg bank's strategy works, theR it would buy (sel}) back
US dollars profitab}y. As this example shows, direct dealings are dependent
oR the other baRl<'s strategles and they make the tracler's iRveRtory contrel
more diff}cult. Besldes, the inquiring bank has to shop around ln order to find
the most competitive quotation. However, this method saves banks brokerage
fees. BaRks who condLict direct dea}lngs are larger ones. ']]hey also particlpate
in a bid process with brokers. Almost all of the transactions between banks
En different local markets take place by direct dealiRgs.
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    Slnce the best quotations of the brokers are known to all the paTticipat-
ing banks, a less competitive price quoted for direct dealings is not likely to
be realized as a transaction price. On the contrary, the best quotations for
direct dealings are not kRown to all of the banks. In this paper we avoid this
complication. We asszime that ouy local foreign exchange market consists of
                                   'one broker and N banks (N = leO, for example). No direct dealings are al}owed
between bagks in our local market. Dlrect dealings with overseas banks are
treated as retail traRsactions ofthe agents who are inqulred oftheir quotations.
    Baitks have yestrictions oR inventory levels of foreigR currencies dttr!ng
aRd at the end of a buslRess day. These restrictions are ca}led dayiight and
overnight limits. The overnight limit is strlcter than the daylight limit. We
model these restrlctions. They have significant coRsequeitces for the arrival
rate of the buyers and sellers at the market. For example, when you observe one
bank selliRg a large quantity of US dollars, the bank may be ekher expending
its inveRtory or selling short. If it is short selling, the bank will have to buy
back US dol}ars sooner or later in order to satisfy the overnight limit, even if
the exchange rate changes vtRfavorably. Ot}i{er traders caB take advantage of
this, if they know that short selling has taken place.
    Outrlght forward transactions do not exist virtually. Almost all of the
forward transactions are done as a part of swap transactions (see Appendix A).
The swap coneract is similar to a repurchase agreemeRt of a security. In case
ofthe most commoR type ofswap transactions, two days af£er the contract £he
currencies are delivered, and the next day the currencies are delivered in the
reverse dii'ection. If a trader waRts to sell forward US dol}ars, then he makes a
swap contract which consists of his b£iying spo£ dollars aRd his selling forward
dollars.
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    A trader who has a swap transactien has to have an extra spot transac-
tion. What accompanies the above example of the swap traRsaction is that
ghe trader sells the spet dollars which he bought as tke spot part ef the swap
transaction. Because the swap transactions are accompanied by the extra spot
transactions, demand and supply of forward exchanges appear in the spot mar-
ket as the same quantkies of demaBd and supply. We caR concentrate on the
spot market without losing the effects of forward exchanges.
    Brokerage fees are parts of the traRsaction costs. It does not seem that
the brokerage fee infiuences the agent's speculative decision. Brokerage fees in
Tokyo are as follows (Yama]xtoto, 1988).
                         Spot US Dollars
        Size of Transac£ion Fees per Million Dollars
    1. one ml}lion do}lars or greater 4,500 yen
    2. smaller than one million dollars,
    greater than halfamillion dollars 7, 500 yeR
    3. smaller than halfa mil}ion clollars 10,OOO yen
    The {mit of the quotation ls o.ol yen pey US dollar. If the exchange rate
changes by the minimum unk, then the chaftge of the value of US dollar in
£erms of Japanese yen is 18,OOO yen for one million dollars and 5,80e yeR for a
half million dollars. MeaRwhl}e, the brokerage fee is 4, 500 yen and 3,750 yen re-
spectively. In the case of one million do}lars, the brokerage fee ls compensated
lf the difference of the transaction prlces is one £mit of the exchange rate in
favor ofthe agent. In our model we do not consider £he effect of the brokerage
fee on the ageRt's transaction dec}slons.
l3
3. CONNECTIONS WITK EXISTING LITERATURE
           3.1. RELEVANCE OF THE MICROSTRUCTURE
    We now discuss how our model of the microstructure of the foreign ex-
change market relates to the existing literature. Key words are random walk,
microstructure, PoissoR process, bid-ask spread, heterogeneotts agents, and
relationship between price volatillty and trading volume. First of all, ex-
change rates seem to follows the raRdom walk. The foreign exchange rate has
not behaved iR coRformity with open macroeconomlcs. Frankel and Meese
(1987) sEtmmarized the inability of macroeconomic approaches to explaln ehe
exchaRge rate determination:
         No set of macroeconomic variables that have been proposed is
     capab}e of explaiRing a very high percentage of the variation in the
     exchaBge rate (p. 128).... A varlety of different econometric ap-
     proaches seem to eRd up at the same conclusien, that the exchaRge
     rate follows a random walk (p. 122).
    A}thoRgh the movemeRt of the exchange rate can be approximated by a
rakdom walk or, in the coRtinuous case, by a Brownian motioR, the movements
are Rot completely random to those who trade in the foreign exchange market.
A partlcle ln the water shows a Byownialt motion as molecules of the water
collide with the par£lcle. In any market, on the otheer hand, indlvidual traders
are decis!on makers. Although their transactions }ook random to econometri-
clans, actions taken by traders are the results of optimizatioRs. Traders col-
lect informa£ioit, form expectatioRs and, for a giveR tradlng mechaRism, make
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transaction decisions. However, academicians have not investigated whether
an individual trader's optimizaeions in the foreign exchange market are consis-
tent with the macroeconomic models. It may be the case that the traders are
responding to some unknown variables as well as to a set of variables included
in the macroeconomic models and that there is no stabilizing mechanism in the
market forcing exchange rates back to a level determined by macroeconomic
factors. There has not been any formal analysis te answer these questions. In
order to identify sources of the randomness of the exchange rate, we need to
understand the acbual tradiRg mechanisra.
    The details efthe tradSng process are studied as a microstrRcture aRalysis
which has been developed mostly forthe equity market. Schwartz (1988) states
what is studied as the microstructure:
         The major analytical issues ...can be classified iinder the fol-
     lowing headings: (1) decisions ofindividual participants in the trad-
     ing process; (2) advent, dissemination, and impact of informatlon;
     (3) retums generation aRd price behavior ofsecuritles; (4) measure
     of marl<et perfoymance (price volatSlity, size of bid-ask spreads, and
     correlation patterns in a security's retums; (5) design featvtres of a
     tradlng system; (6) regulatlon of the market.
Here we address (1), (2) and (4).
    The foreign exchaBge rr}arket is a wholesale market. On the other hand,in
the equity market, a speeialist who can be a monopolist faces retail customers.
Modeis developed for the equity market are not directly appllcab}e to the
foreigR exchange rr}arket. Boothe (1988, p. 486) states:
         The stock market is essentla}ly a retail market where individ-
     ual agents confront stock specialist with fiRal s£ipplies and demand
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     for equities. The exchange market, however, is more of a whole-
     sa}e market where currency traders (usually banks) deal with each
    other primarily to satisfy the demands of their customers but also
    for their own account. Thus, rather than modeling the tradlng
     between customer aRd speciallst as in the stock market, in the ex-
     change market k is necessary to consider trading amoitg themselves.
     The speciallst in the stock market often is a monopolist of the steck
     which he is dealing.
    The quantity traded ln the market is much blgger than the aggregate
retail demand and supply. The differences are generated by the agents within
the foreigit exchange market. Only 5 peercent of the trading vo}ume of foreign
exchanges all over the world correspond to intemationa} trades and capital
transactions (See Ruck, 1981). In our mode}, as sugges£ed in Boothe (1988),
agents' transaction decis!ons on their profu motivation, and not just the bal-
ancing the retai} traRsactions, infiiience the exchange rate.
         We presuppose that indivldual traders are concerned with
     claily pyofu maxlmizations. Tke current accottnt of a llation re-
     sponds to tke exchange rate but the response is too slow to have
     any recognizable effect on the dai}y demaRd and supply of the ex-
     chafige rate. With these presgppositions, our model shows £hat
     iR intra-day price formation theye is no mechanism to put the ex-
     change rate to the level which is consistent with macroeconomlc
     models. In this regard, a metaphor with the equity price which
     appears in Ma}kiel (1985, p. 98) i$ shared by exchange rates:
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         ...stock prices are in a sense aRchored to certain "fundamen-
     tals" bnt the anchor is easily pulled up aRd then dropped in another
     place.
                   3.2. DOUBLE-SIDED AUCTION
    The literature on auction theories is mainly concerned with cases where
either one seller faces many buyers or one bttyer faces many sellers. The
double-sided auctlon has not been investigated iit the context of exchange rate
determiBation.
    With regard to dificulties of modeling a sealed axxd an oral double-slded
aikctloit, McAfee aRd McMillan (l987, p. 726) stated:
         Few results on the double auction exist, becattse of the diffi-
     culties of modeling strategic behavior on both sides of the market.
     ...The oral double auctiofi, wlth the bids and offers open}y called,
     is still more difllcult to model because the process takes place over
     time axxd ageiits do not know what prices wil} be available if they
     wait instead of trading now.
    This dissertatioB cuts across the difi}cu}ties mentioned above. Our main
theoretical feat£{res, the arrlval inteRsities of the buyers and sellers and the
assigning of an FLE distribution function, make it possible to apply the double-
sided auction's fraixiework.
                      3.3. POISSON PROCESS
    Auctions in foreign exchange and eciuity markets are contiRuous. Buyers
and sellers arrive asynchroRously. Garman (1976) was the fust to model the
asynchronous aryivals of buyers and sellers as a Poisson process. In his woyds
(p. 257), "It is assmned that a collectlon of market agents can be treatecl as a
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statistical eRsemble." He specified the arrivals of btty aitd se}1 orders of a given
s£ock as a PoissoR processes and he presented two models of price determina-
tion. The fust one is about the determinatien of a monopoly dealer's quotes in
the equity market. Garman's dealer firrn sets quotes to maximize its expected
profits from trading per period time. Tkis second model is a double-sided
auction model where there is Bo market maker quoting buying aBd selling
prices concurrently. Garman's second model is Markov process where a sam-
ple of the quotations and the itumber of ordeys associated with these sample
quotations constitvtte a state space. Using Ko}mogorov's backward equation,
Garman tried to derive a stationary distrlbutioit of the states which are defined
as above. Howevey the stationary distribntion was intractable.
    The foreign exchaRge market fal}s somewhere between Garman's two
models. There is no monopolist market maker as Garman assumed for the
equity markeg. Instead, there is a possibility that some of the agents will be-
come the market makers. In otir model, tlke agents who are Reither btdlish
nor bearish may qtiote both buying and selling prices concurrently as their
optimiziRg actiolls. Agen£s become market makers in order to take advantage
of cliffereitces in the expectatioRs among agents. The introduction of the mar-
ket makers into the bidding process reduces the fiuctuation of the transaction
prices to a naryower range than the one in Garman's auction market model.
The reason is that as }ong as the market makey keeps quoting both buying and
se}}lng prlces, the tra}3sactlon price wl}l never go outside of an interval glven
by the market maker's ciuotations.
    Garman iRtended to derlvethe stationary distribution. Butthe stationary
distribution is ephemeral. It will dlsappear when someone finds lt and tries
to take advaRtage of it. An agent who figured out the stationary distrlbutioB
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can have positlve profit by acting as a market maker. Orders which are less
competitive thaR the market maker's quotatlons will not be executed as long
as the market maker maintaiRs his quotations. These orders will not disappear
unless they are canceled. The process from which the statioRary distribution
has been derived no longer exists.
    In our mode}, the Rumber of arriva}s has a Poisson distyibutlon and the
quantity associated w!th each arrival is also a random varlable. What we have
is a compound Polsson process (see Appendix B). This specification is applied
in two places. First, the arrivals of retail cttstomers at an agent are assumed
to constitRte a stationary compouRd Poisson process. Secondly, the arrivals
of buyers and se}lers at the market are modeled as RoRstationary compottnd
Poisson processes. Here nonstationarity means that for a given quotation, the
arrlval ifitepsities of agents who would hit that quotatlon may change from
time to time. Thls nonstationarity is caijised by skSfts in the FLE distribution.
The heterogeneity of quot&tions in Garman's model is geneyated by the het-
erogenelty of the individual traders' reservation prlces whose determiitations
were left unexpiained. Our model's couBterpart ofthe reservation price is each
agent's expected, FLE value.
    Strict}y speaking, the number of retail customers and agents is finite.
rlrhe ayrival process is a collection of binomial decisioR processes of indivldtia}
customers and agei{ts who are finite in number. The Poisson distribution is a
limit of biRomial distyibutions as the Rumber of trials goes to infinity. Since
the ntimber of retail customers per agent ancl the ftumber of agents ln the
market is typically more thaR 100, we can assume for our analy$is tha£ the
arrival process constitutes a Poisson process.
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    Specifying asynchronous arrivals of the buyers and sellers as PoissoR pro-
cess has wide applicablllty. An example is Tinic (1972, p. 81), who describes
a specialist in the equity market:
         The level of trading activity in a stock infiuences the size of
     inventories carried by the special!sts. In general, the higher the
     level of tradiRg, the greater £he chafice tha£ buy and sell orders wi}1
     tend to balance durikg a trading period. BeyoRd this,the larger the
     turnover,theeasieritisforthespecialisttomakeadjustmentsinhis
     pesition, because sizable trading activity refiects traders' inteyest in
     a stock. To the extent that active markets tend to self-equate, the
     need for specialist's invelttory participatioR is reduced,in terms of
     both the average size of positlons and the average holding period.
    If the arrival processes of buy and sell orders in the above statement are
assumed to be Polsson processes wi£h equal arrival ikteBsities, the expected
number of times in whick the specialist's position becomes square increases as
the orders; arrival intensities lncrease. However, atthe same time, the pyoba-
bility that the specialist's posltion is sqllare at a given epoch decreases. The
statement in Tinic (1972) is Rot straightforwardly justified mathematically.
                          3.4. LXQUIDITY
    As aR application of a Poisson process, the }lquidky of an asset can be
defined in £erms of Poisson process. The liquidity can be defined using the
arrival intensities ofthe buyers and sellers and the heterogeneity of thelr quo-
tations. Antlclues aRd art works have very low arrlva} intensities of buyers
and sellers, but a distributlon of the heterogeneous quotatlons is st&ble over
a }ong time. Another example of the application of o£ir approach is the price
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of real estate. Real estate has the low arrival intensities of buyers and sellers.
Each real estate transactlon has specific characteristics. An iRdividua} buyer
is looking for real estate with ideal chayacteristics. For a giveR piece of real
estate, the butyer's quotation ls determined, depending on its distance from
these ideal characteristics. If we measure the distributions ofideal characters
among the buyers, thell for a given piece of real estate, we can define the dis-
tr2bution of the heterogeneous quotations. And if, iR addi£ion, we defiRe the
arrival rate of the buyers at the market from the general public, then we can
derive the arrival intensi£ies of the buyers who decide to buy the given real
estate. The liq£tldl£y ofthe real estate !s defined as the inverse of an expected
waiting tlme until sold at a mean value of the buyer's quotatloit. If the se}ler
cannoe wait, lt becomes a fire sale.
    According to Schwartz (1988),
         Llquid markets are characterized by depth, breadth, and re-
     siliency:
         Depth: A market has depth lf a suff}cient number of orders
         exlsts at prices above and be}ow the price at whlch shares are
         currently trading.
         Breadth: A market has breadth, if these orders exist in sub-
         seantial volume.
         Resiliency: A rnarket has resiliency if £emporary price changes
         clue to temporary order imba}aRces qulckly attract new orders
         to the market.
    Our model can be described as a market with depth of varying degree.
As the expectecl number of agents who are quoting (i.e., ifi the crysta}-glass
state) increases or as the varlance of FLE va}ues decreases, the market has
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more depth and the more agents are quoting arognd the current price. IR
this case, the batched arrlvals cause small disturbances in the sequence of
the kransactioit prices. The quantity which is associated with & given agent's
quotation is always equal to the ageRt's daylight limit, or to twice as mttch as
the daylight limit, if the agent is waitiRg on his quotations. Since the quantky
associated with the quotation does not vary except for the daylight limit and
its double amount,` we cannot describe the breadth of the market. Resiliency
is only partly described in our model at ehis stage. Unless we have a mechanism
to allow the agents to gradually adjust their position while they have bullish
or bearlsh expectatioRs, we cannot attribute resilieRcy to the agents' decisioit
making. In our model, the arrival intensities of bLiyeys and sellers do not
respond to temporary price changes. However resiliency caB be attributed to
the nonstationarity of the aggregate retail demand aad supply.
            3.5. DETERMINATION OF BID-ASK SPREAD
    Modeling the determination of bid-ask spread is a xxontrlvial problem.
Amihud and Mendelson (1980) considered a moRopo}ist market maker's epti-
mization problem. They depicted stochastic demand and supply as a price-
depende}it Poisson process. They showed the dependeitce ofthe bid-ask prices
oR the market maker's stock ixventory position.
    AIIen (1977) modeled the behavior of a risk-averse bank trader who buys
or sel}s foreign exchange "with a view to pyofitab}y reversing the transaction
in the future". Allell's model is the first microstructure model of the foreign
exchange market. He showed that the increased variance of tke expected fut#re
    `If the posltion is square, £he cluantity is eqv{al to the daylight limit. Ifthe agent has a short (long) posltion, the quantity to b"y (sell) is twice as
much as the claylight limit.
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prices will cause the profit-maximizing, risk-averse trader to widen his bid-ask
spread. Widening the spread can be interpreted as rais!ng the price charged
by the bank for its liquidity service.
    AlleR treats a baRk as a moRopolist and do not coRsider interactions
between the market makeys. In the equity markets, market makers are mo-
nopolist but this is not the case iR foreign exchange markets. In our model, we
do not asstime that the market maker is a monopolist. A wider spread is the
result of a higher degree of heterogeneity of expectations among the agents.
    GarmaR's model of an avtc£ion with a hroker (l976) covers the determi-
nation of the bid-ask spread. Howeveer, it did not have a clear result because
the multivariate sta£ionary dis£ribution of the quotat!oRs aRd quantities was
Entractable. Cohen et al. (1986) ana}yzed the biCl-ask spread in a limit order
market of an equity which is equlvalent to Garman's auctlon market. First,
they focused oR stochastic characteristics of the ask price. They modeled the
manket-ask-price generatlon process as a compottnd Poisson process (See Ap-
pendix B). The ask price evolves as it jttmps randomly. TheR they assumed
that each such jurnp is a random varlable that is indepeRdent}y and identlcally
dlstrlbuted over time with mean zero and some variance. The assumption can-
not be reconciled with the resiliency of the £r}arket (See Section 3.4). Market
resi}iency implies that the majorlty of agents have similar expectations about
the transaction price, and that if traRsactlon prices deviate from their expec-
tations, they respond in a manner that stabilizes the transaction price. As a
characteyistic of the stochastic process, the resiliency imp}ies that the distribu-
tioll of thejump depends on where the curreRt pyice is. Our model descrlbes
a limited case of the resiliency where the heterogeneity of the expectation is
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not stationary. If it is stationary, thejump in the transaction price can be ap-
proximated by i.i.d. random variables wkh mean O. If it is nen-stationary, the
distribution functioR of the jump depends oR the current transaction price.
Regarding the distribution of FLE values among the agents, we caR distin-
guish two cases. [rhe first case is when the heterogeReity of the expectation is
stationary5 axd thejump iR the transaction price can be approximated by an
i.i.d. random variab}e with mean O. The second case is when the heterogeneity
is nonstationary with mean different from o.
    Cohen et al. (1986) showed wky a bid-ask spread exists in an auction
market. They assumed that investors make transaction decislons for a given
trading period and that the price is a con£inuous variable. Summarizing their
work, Schwartz (1988, p. 336) wrltes:
         Can a buyer make the probability of execntioR infinitesimally
     c}ose to unity by writing the buy order at a pyice IRfinitesirnally
     c}ose to, but stil} below, the market ask? No, he or she canBot;
     a RoR-infinitesima} probabi}ity will remain that the ask price w!11
     increase, aRd that the buy llmit that had been infiRltesima}ly close
     £o it will not be hit ln the tradlng perlod.
    This statemellt says that a tracler who is afraid of mlssing the curreRt
ask prlce hits the ask price rather than putting his quote close to the ask
price. Their ana}ysis has three problems. First, that they cannot explain
how someone chose a specific va}ue for the existing ask price. Second, their
model is limited to a given perlod whose }ength Es }eft unexplained, and that it
does not considei' the posslbility that the buyer may optimize over the periods
    5The FLE dlstributioi3 function stays at the same locatlon.
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using dynamic prograrnmiRg method. Third, since the price is not actually a
continuous variable, the!r argument is not app}icable without explaRatlon of
why the bid-ask spread remains more than a unit of measurement of the price.
    The basic source of the diflicuities in Cohen et al. in modeling the bid-ask
spread is the lack a model for cont!nuous double-sided auctions.
    We presuppose£hat the fluctuations iR the transaction price are generated
by two types ofthe fluctuations: fiuctuatioRs within a giveR FLE dlstribution
and fiuctuations dtte to shifts of the FLE dis£ribu£ion. As long as the FLE
distribution stays the same (stationary heterogeneity), the agent can profit by
becoming a market maker. ARy price in a support of the d!stribation can be
reached although the expected waiting time may be infinity. The agent will
wait on his quotation rather than hitting the available price !n the market. If
other agents recognize what s£atioRary heteyogeneity brlngs, theit the bid and
ask spread wM converge to the minimum tinit as more of the agents quote their
prices aRd wait on them. }Iowever, we wil} not obseyve such a sittiation. It is
posslble that the FLE distri5utlon itself shifts. Once this happens, the price
which the ageBt is waiting on may be outside of the support of the distributioR
functioR from which the new quotatioRs are chosen. Oy the arrival intensity of
ageRts who wou}d hit the agent's quotation may be greatly decreased. When
the agent observes a price fiuctvtation, £he agent cannot identify its reason.
The agent wil} hit the available prlce IR the marke£ rather than waiting on his
owR quotat}on.
    In. our model, since the agents are heterogeneous with respect to FLE
value and their confidence level about their expectations, transactions take
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place before the competit!on among buyers or sellers (i.e., additional arrivals
of the bvtyers or sellers) will Rarrow the spread.
                 3.6. HETEROGENEITY OF AGENTS
    Mendelson (l985) introduced heterogeneity of traders into the microstruc-
eure mode}s. He aitalyzed a case where the preferences and the endowments
of the traders are heterogeneous. He proved that increasing the number of
traders always reduces the variability of market clearing prices, and that in-
creasing the variabi}ity of the traders' valuations briRgs about aR increase in
price variability. Heterogeneity of preferences is descrlbed as a difference in
reservatioll prices. Randomly the traders have allocation of one unit of an
asset or none at all. Their resei'vatlon prices vary accord!ng to a ttRderlying
distribution. A market clearing price fluctuates less as the variance of the
reservation prices becomes smaller and as the number of the traders increases.
Our model is simi}ar to Mende}son's with regard to the randomness of the
endowments of the asset and the heterogeneity ef the reservatien price. The
dfference is that while Mendelson does not a}low speculation acyoss periods,
in our model the speculat!on based on the expected time path of the prices
plays an important role. Mendelson's mode} is a multiperlod model without
specu}ation. Therefore, his model explains only the relationsh!p between the
heterogeneity ofthe traders and the price fiuctuation. In the foreigit exchange
market, however, the traders can hold inventory. Mendeison (l985, p. 256)
stated that:
         The "market-inicrosgructure" literature typically follows Gar-
     man (l976). ...Correspondingly, the elementary buRding blocks
     of the resulting models are stochastic "erder generating processes"
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     which represent aggregate market behavior, rather than the charac-
     teristics of individual market agegts. This makes it difficult, if itot
     impossible, te examine how various traders' characteristics affect
     the resulting market outcomes, and to perform meaningful com-
     parisons between models with different values of the relevant pa-
     rameters (or different models of exchange).
    In our model, at random epochs, the ageRts are randomly characterized
by their expecta£ions (i.e., the states ofglass and FLE) and retail transactions.
Indlvidual agents' characteristlcs affect mayket outcomes as in Mendelson. It
is not clear that a sequence of competitive equilibrium converges to the con-
tmuous auctloR.
    Miich forma} ana}ysis of the sec"rity market assumes that different in-
vestors have homogeneous expectations. For example, the standard capltal
asset pricing model assumes komogeneous expectations. However, if we as-
sttme homogeneity of expectations in the foreign exchaBge market, we lose an
essentlal part of the lntra-day price formation process. Takahashi (l989, p.
109) states a businessman's understanding that traders in foreign exchange
markets have heterogeReous expecta£lons:
         If US do}lar ls traded &t 12bV yen, for example, it implies that
     those who want to sell US dol}ar at 125 yen exist on oRe hand and
     those who want to buy at 125 yen exist on the other hand and that
     the exchange rate is equilibrated a£ it. It ls diflllcu}t to forecast
     a direction for which the exchange rate is heading for. In short,
     reasons to buy US clollars are equillbrated with reasons to sel}.
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    Schwartz (1988, p. 272) justifies the assumption of the heterogeneous
expectations as fo}lows.
         Expectations are heterogeneous becavtse information is cost!y
     and investors do not have perfect informat!on. Each investor ob-
     tains that quaRtity of iRformatioB that is deeiined to be optimal,
     given hls or her cost of acquiring it and eMclency as an informa-
     tion processor. Crhe cost of obtainiRg and the beRefit of having
     information differ appreciably across investors.
    It is not clear what the cost of obtainiRg information is iR the foreign
exchange market. What is meaRt by "perfect informatlen" or "information
processor" depends on the underlying model. In the capital asset pr!cing
inodel for securities, perfect iRformatioR implies knowledge about the mean
and variance of security returns. For ogr intra-day price formation process
in the foreign exchaRge market, many of the variables which infiuence the
transact2oR pr!ce are Aot measured daily or are net available to many of the
agents. For example, yetai} transactions are decisive factors in the agent's
decision making, bug, iR general, the agent cannot know the retail transactions
of other agents. Perfect information caftnot be obtained ln our analysis. The
intra-day price formation process is a process by which iRfo;mation bits are
being dissemina£ed among the agents.
    IR Schwartz (i988), an !nformatiok processor seems to mean an ecoRo-
metric model or technique of security analysis, for exarr}ple. However, such
kRowledge can be called information rather than iRformation processor. The
definition of informatlon needs further clarificatioR. As will be discussed in
Chapter 5, iRformation is a a-field of a family of subsets aRd, these subsets
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are defined iR a space which has infinite e}ements. News and an econometric
model are those subsets. Obtaining an information bit is equivalent to a refine-
ment ofthe a-field. Perfect information means having a cr-field generated by
all the subsets which are possessed by the iRdividual agents. It is impossible
to have such a a-field, because there is no mechaRism for transferring some
of the information bits betweeR the agents. Thus, agents have heterogeneous
information and expectations.
    Figlewski (1978) assumes that market paTticipants possess heterogeneous
informatlon, price expectations and differeRt wealth endowments. Few of the
marke£ participants can predict consisteRtly over time, while some others may
be richly rewarded by chance. In a Iarge populatioR of investors, some may
win often on}y by chance. We caRnot tell who is the raost accurate forecaster.
Thus, expectations remain heterogeneous and the market does xxot completely
achleve accurate prices. This is Figlewski's rationale to assume persistence of
the heterogeneity of information. Names of traders of individual transactions
are only partially known in the foreign exchange rnarket. The agents in our
model cannot know who was a winner. Their expectations remain heteroge-
neous.
    The market descrlbed in Fig}ewski (1978) can be compared to a bet on
a horse race. There exists an underlying mechanism for determining the out-
come of the horse race. Participants in the betting have forecast formulas of
various degree of accuracy. A distribtitioR of the bet on the individual horses
determiRes the wiim2ng ureturn. If you choose a favorite, your rate of retm'n
w!11 be smaller than otherwise, when your forecast turns out to be correct.
However, the forecast aRd bets do not iRfiueRce the factors which determine
a winner of the ra,ce. Btit in tke foreign exchange market, on the contrary,
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participants' forecasts infiuence the outcome of the race. In this regard our
model is essentially different from Figlewski's.
             3.7. VOLATILITY AND TRADING VOLUME
    A positive relationship beeweeR price volatllity aRd trading voleme in fu-
tures and equity markets is found in empirical studies. Two kinds of stochastic
models have been suggested forthe relationship between volatility and trading
volume. One is by Clark (1973) and the other is by Epps aRd Epps (1976)
and Tauchen and Pkts (1983).
    In Clark (1973), the price evolves according to the event time, Rot by
calender time. AR arrival of Rews measgres the time. The news induces trans-
actions and jzimps iR price. The jump iit the prlce is assumed to be an i.i.d.
random variable. Tlte dai}y price change ls the sum of these yandom jumps.
Then the variance of the dai}y price change is the sum of the variances of the
individua} jumps and hence, a random variable whose mean is proportional
to an expected number of daily traRsactions. Thus the variance of the daily
price change tends to be larger when the tradlng volume is larger. The posi-
tive yelationship between price volatility and trading volume is aR immediate
consequence of such a specification of the price evolution. If we assume that
the mimbey ofjumps in the price fol}ows a Poisson distribution, then CIark's
specificatioR implies that the price evolves as it jumps and that the sum of the
jumps constieutes a compound Poisson process. A problem with Clark's model
is that it dea}s wlth a call market,6 instead of a contiRuous auctlon market,
although he analyzes the cotton future marke£ where the auctlon process is
    6The essence of a cal} is that orders that have been accumulated over a
period of time are batched for simultaneotts execut!on, and all the crossing
orders are executed at the same price (Schwaytz, 1988, p. 20).
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contiRuous. It is not clear that a sequeBce of the transactions in the call mar-
ket can approximate the continuous auction. His model has another problem.
Information cannot dissem!nate throttghout the market instantly. We cannot
assurne thejumps in price constitute an i.i.d. random variable during the
dissemination of the Rews as we shorten interval of the period for which the
orders are batched together for the call market.
    The second type of model of volatility and trading volttme is presented
by Epps and Epps (1976) and [{)aucheR and Pitts (1983). [{]heir specification is
that the change in tke market pr!ce on each within-day transaction or market
clearing is the average of the changes in al} of the traders' reservatioR prices.
Tauchen and Pitts (l983) state:
         Epps aRd Epps assttme there is a positive relationship between
     the extent to which traders disagree when they revise their reserva-
     tion prices and the absolute value ofthe change in the market price.
     That is, an increase in the extent to which traders disagyee Ss as-
     sociated w!th a larger absolute price change. The price variabi}lty-
     volume relationship arises, then, because the vo}ume of trading is
     positively related to the exteRt to which traders disagree wheR they
     revise their reservation prices (p. 485). ...Epps and Epps's key as-
     sumption gives them a nearly exact positlve re}ationshlp between
     the absolute value of the change ln the market price and the trading
     volume oR each wkhiit-day marke£ clearing (p. 487).
    The price may Rot jttmp with a proportionately }arge trading volume as
assumed in Epps and Epps. In order to overcome thls problem, Tauchen aBd
Pitts (i983) in£rod<iced a scheme of variance components into the rnodel. A
change iR the reservation price coRsists of two parts. One part is common to
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all traders and the other part is specific to one trader. If the change in the
reservation price is due to the common part, the marker cleariRg price jumps
without being accompanied by a large trading volume.
    Their model assv!mes a call market. They never specify how we can define
a Wa}rasian equllibrium price from the seqttence of transactioR prices observed
in the continttous auction. Another problem of their model is that there is no
explanatioR of why the trader's desired position is given by a constaRt mu}tiple
ofthe distaBce between the transactioR price aRd the trader's reservation price.
    In our model, thejumps ln the traksactioit price are not always i.i.d.. We
show that if the heterogeneity of the expectations is stationary, then the jump
in the traRsaction price caB be approxirnated by an i.i.d. yandom variable.
If the heterogeneity of FLE values is not statioRary, theR the jumps are not
identically distributed. If we increase the expected number of transitions of
expectations, then the expected trading volttme iRcreases. If the FLE distri-
bution shift$, then the transactioR prlce will shift without an accompanying
increased trading volume. Our mode} specifies the process by which the ar-
rivals of buyeys aRd sellers are generated. Also, in our model, informatioR is
translated into the arrival intensit!es. We can analyze the respective effects
of buyers and sellers who are reotivated by heterogeneous expectations orjust
by liquidity purposes.
32
PART 2.
4. THE AGENT,SOPTIbvC[IZATION PROBLEM
         4.1. CONSTRUCTIeN OF OPTIMIZATION PReBLEM
    In this chapter we specify an agent's optimization problem. For a given
expected time path of the exchange rate, agent are assumed to maximize ex-
pected profit over a given tirce period. We show that an action the ageBttakes
depends on his expected FLE value. Assuming thatthe exchange-rate process
is piece-wise stationary, we show that sequences of optimizations using most
recently updated FLE vaiues lead to over all optimization. This implies that
the optimal pegicyi is to concentrate on profit maximizatlon in each interval
where the expected time path is rRonotone. By showing the role of FLE val-
ues, we obtain a rationa}e for assigning a distribution function to the FLE
values held by agents. The solutlon to the optimization problem wii} lead to
the derivation of arrival intensities in Chapter 6.
    The agent trades in a wholesale market oB the one hand and trades with
his retail customers on the other. The difference between selling and bttying
prlces and the fixed rate of commission for a reta!} transaction become the
agent's profit. The agent's optimizatlon problem is essentially an inventory
    'A policy is a contiRgency plaR for choosing actions (Heyman aRd Sobel,
1984).
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control problem. ]IIowever, siRce the auction is double-sided, agents have two
kinds of feasible actions: when the agent wants to trade iR the market, the
agent can choose either a price (i.e., waiting on his quotation) or his inventory
level i.e., hitting oRe ofthe market rates.2 Ifthe ageRt chooses the price, then
his position becomes a random variable. If he chooses his poskion, the price
becomes exogenous. Although the agent knows the price when he makes a
transactioR decision, this given value of the price is a realization of a random
process. Since the agent can choose elther his price or hls position, a set of
feasib}e actions is the product of two subsets: one for choosing the price; and
the other foer choosing the position.
    In Section 4.1, we wlll define variables and write out an equation of the
agent's profit. A closed interval between epoch ti aRd t2 is denoted by [ti, t2].
The exchange rate is the price of US dollars in terms of the local currency.
For the sake of simplicity, the actual exchange rates with decimal points are
redefined to posltive integers. Let S), be a fiRite subset of positive integers
whose elements are valttes which the exchange rate may take (for example,
st, == {1,2,...,200} ). We defiRe raRdom variables A(t) G st,, B(t) E 9, and
S(t) E 9, as
        A(t): minimum selling price quoted in the market at epoch t.
            This is ca}led the ofered rate or asked rate.
        B(t): maximum buying price quoted'in the market at epoch t.
            This is called the bid rate.
        S(t): price of the most recent transaction up to and iBcluding
             epoch t.
    2see the following paragraph for a definition of the latter
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The bid and effered rates together are called the market rates at epoch t. At
any epoch when a transaction takes place, S(t) coincides with A(t) or B(t).
We assume that the agent's retail prices are determined by the current market
rates, A(t) and B(t), and a constant margin c, with constant c being exogenolisly
glven.
    A(4 - l): At epoch t, the retall selling prlce is A(t) +c and the retail
    buying price is B(t) -- c.
 The agent trades aRy quantity with retail customers whenever they want
to. The quantity and the epoch of each retail transaction are random. The
conseant margiR c becomes a sure profit if the agent buys from (sells to) the
market right away when he sells to (bltys from) the custemer. Let st, be a
subset of non-negative integers, iRcluding O. Random variables fbr the retail
transactions, Ri(t) E stq and R2(t) E stg, are defiRed as cumulative quantities.
     Ri(t): cumi2}a£ive quantity purchased from customers during [O,t].
     R2(t): cumulative quantity sold to customers during [o,t].
              'SiRce Ri(t) aBd R2(t) are cumulative quantities, dRi(t)>O aitd dR2(t)>O
signify occurreRces of retai1 transactions at epoch t. We use the following
conveBtion for subscripts of the variables. Variables wkh subscript 1 give rise
to increases in the agent's US dollar position, and variab}es with subscript 2
lead to decreases in the agent's posltion.
    A(4 - 2): the arrivals of retail buyers and sel}ers constitute compound
    Poisson processes (see AppeRdix B).
    The co;npound Poisson process implies that the number of arrivais is
PoissoR distx'ibuted aRd that the quantity of each transaction ls a random
variable with some distribtttion. Let ori (ct?) be an arrival lntensity of retail
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sellers (buyers) aRd let C be a quantity traded at each retail transaction. Since
R! and R2 are the cumulative quantities generated by the compeund Poisson
processes, the expected values ef Ri and R2 for epoch to are proportionate to
the length of time. Assuming Ri(O) = R2(O) = O, the expected values are given
by E[Ri(to)]=aitoE[C] and E[R2(to)] :a2teE[C].
    Besides retail traRsactions, the agent has wholesale transactions in the
market. In order to describe his wholesale transactions, we define random
variables ZiGstg and Z2Estq asfollows.
      Zi(t): cumu}ative guantky purchased from the market during [o,t]
      Z2(t): cumulative quantity sold to the market during [o,t]
If dZi(t) and dZ2(t) are positive, they are quantlties which the agent bought
and sold in the market at epoch t. We define the prices applied to dZi(t) as
follows.
     Si(t): a prlce applied to dZi(t)
     S2(t): a prlce applied to dZ2(t)
    Si(t) E stp aRd S2(t) E st, can be random variables, depending on actions
which the agen£ £akes. 3 Si(t) and S2(t) are specific to the agent, while S(t) is
common to all ageRts.
    The Stleltjes integral can be defined for a monotonically increasing, but
Bot continueus, functioll like Ri(t) and zi(t). By definition,we have JliO dRi(t) --
Ri(to) and J30 dZi(t) = Zi(to). Using the Stieltjes integral, wholesale revenue and
cost durlng iRteyval [O,to] are expressed as JKOS2(t)dZ2(t) and fll"Si(t)dZi(t),
    3Thls is exp}ained in Section 4.2.
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respectively and revenue and cost ef the retail transactions are Jlje(A(t) +
c)dR2(t) and JliO(B(t)-c)dRi(t),respect!vely.
    Let ff[o,T] be the agent's profit over interval [e,T]. UsiRg the above ex-
pressions for revenues and costs, the agent's profit during (e,T] is
R[o,n ,. ,1(IT s,(t) dz,(t) - ygT s,(t)dz,(t) + y(iT(A(t) + ,) dR,(t) - y[T(B(t) - ,) dR,(t)
      , y[IT s2(t) dz,(t) - y[T s,(t)dz, (t) + y[T A(t) dR2(t) - yCT B(t) dRi(t)
         +c(R2(T)+Ri(T)). (4-1)
                       4.2. CONSTRAINTS
    Next, we spec!fy the constraints for the profit maximSzation problem. Let
a random variable Z(t) clenote the agent's posltioR at epoch t, i.e.,
                 Z(t)iEZi(t)-Z2(t)+io+Ri(t)-R2(t), (4-2)
where ze is an inltial valtte of Z(t) at epoch O. z(t) takes values from a finite
subset of integers; Z(t) G {y1y= xi - x2+x3 - x4, xi e 9g,i= 1,...,4}･ Z #O
means an open position and Z >o ( Z <o) means a long (short) position.
The last two terms of (4 - 2), the cumtilative retail transactions, are random
and exogenously given te the agent. The agent can control Z(t) by increasing
Zi(t) or Z2(t), but ak iRstaBtaneous adjttstment of Zi(t) or Z2(t) ls not always
possible. We distinguish desired values of Z(t), Zi(t) and Z2(t) from their actual
values. This is a varlation ofthe iRventory control problem. If the agent wants
to control Z(t), Zi(t) and Z2(t), then his decision is made on the desired values
of these varlables. Define,
       Z,'(t): desired value o£ Zi(t),
       Z2'(t): desired value of Z2(t),
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       z*(t): desired value of z(t).
    In order to preveBt catastroph!c losses, the management does itot allow
an agent to assume an lnfinite open positioB, no matter what expectations
the agent has. The management of a bank for which the agent works imposes
restrictions on the magnitude of the ageRt's epen position. [['hese restrictions
are imposed on the desired valtte of Z(t) instead of the actual valtte. This is
because the actual value Z(t) jumps from time to time dtte to the randomly
arrivSng ret&il transactions and it is impossible to control z(t) completely. If
z(t) violates the constraint at a certain epoch, the agent tries to adjust Z(t) to
Z"(t) by taking aR action which is feasible at that epoch.
    The restrictions on the opeR positioR are applied duriRg and at the end
ofthe business day. The restrictions are exogenously given to the agent by his
bank. The maximum magnltude of the open position which is allowed during
the btisiness day is callecl the daylight limit. Let L denote the daylight limit.
Its value is a posltive integer.
    A(4 - 3): Let L be the daylight limit, theR IZ'(t)1 s L for tG {O,T].
    The restrlction on the opeR position at the end of the btisiness day is
ca}led the overnigl}t limit. The overnight limit is stricter than the daylight
limit.
    A(4 - 4): The overnight }lmit is o.
    If the overnight llmit is not zero, then the agent faces.an overnight profit
maximization. If the agent has a short (long) position at the end of the
business day, the agent may borrow (Iend) overnight. We woulcl like to avoid
the complicatioB of having a loan market in our model at this stage. However,
if all ofthe market makers' ovemight }imks are zero,this coRstraint iBtrocluces
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a compllcated dynamic programming problem. Also, almost surely not all
agents will have square positions at the end of the business day, because the
aggregate retail demand and supply will almost surely differ, eveR if thelr
expected values are equal. We Reed market makers4 who caR absorb the excess
of the aggregate retail demand until the very last epoch of the bttsiness day.
    A(4-s): Individual local Er}arkets oR the globe have their specific business
    hours. Each market has one broker. The start and the eBd of business
    hours of the local market overlap with neighboriRg local markets. Seme
    of the ageRts have branches in the neighboring loca} markets. At the
    end of the business day, some of the ageRts who have overseas branches
    remain as market makers. If their positions are open when the transac-
    tioks iR our }ocal market are completed, these market makers continue
    to make transactions with their branches. The prices applied fer these
    inter-branch transactions are the same as the market rates at the last
    epoch. If the market maker ends with the short (long) position, he buys
    from (se}ls to) the overseas braRch at the last effered (bid) rate of local
    market.
                4.3. CHelCE OF FEASIBLE ACTIONS
    Expected values for S(t), B(t) and A(t) have to be derived. Let Y(t) be
the mid point of the market rates at epoch t. The price at which the ageRt
will trade at epoch tifi the futxre can be either B(t) or A(t), depeRding on the
actions the agent takes. Let 2u be an expected bid-ask spread and ]Tt, be
    `Agents who quote both buying and selling prices at the same time.
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the infbrmation which the agent has at epoch to. Fortk to,the expectation is
conditional on 1},. The expected v&lues of B(t) and A(t) are denoted by:
         c(t)iii}E[A(t)+B(t)lj[lt,]=EIY(t)I.1},],
        Ca(t)=-E[A(t)l1lt,]=6(t)+u, Cb(t)iE!E[B(t)ln,]=:6(t)-u･
AB agent is called bearish (bullish) at epoch to, if g(t) has an interval [to,[Ib]
such that fl{li,Q < o ( S!{ll,g) > o ), for t e [to,fib].
    The expectaeion of fi[to,T], the profit as defined in (4 - 1), is conditional
on J1,. The expected profit depends oB the agent's choice of actions as well as
the arrival processes of bzryers and sellers in the market. We need to specify
a set of feasible actions. Let r be a set of actions which is feasible at epoch t.
TheR, r ls a collection of four coordinate vectors such that r g stp × stp × stg × 9g
and T =- {Si" (t),S2'(t), Z,'(t), Z2* (t)}. The action is defined for an epoch. We define
rh and r. to besttbsets of Ir.
      Sr(t): Agent's own quotatioR at epoch t £o have dZi(t) > e.
      S2*(t): AgeRt's own quotation at epochtto have dZ2(t)> o.
         rh: A set of actioits such that the ageRt chooses values for
            z,"(t) and z,'(t) aitd that he adjusts Zi(t) and Z2(t) to Z,'(t)
            and Z,'(t) immediately. dZr(t) aRd dZ,'(t) are not positive at
            the same epoch. S,"(t) and S2'(t) are equal to the availab}e
            quotatioRs in the market.
        r.: A set of ac£lons such that the agent chooses Sl(t) and Ss(t),
            quotes one or both ofthem, and waits for havlng his quo-
            tation hit. dZr(t) and dZ,"(t) are realized raRdorn}y.
rh meaRs that the agent hits one of the market rates. It is possible that dz;(t)
is larger £han the quantity avallable at the existing market rate. Shou}d th!s
occur, less competitive quotations may be hlt also at the same epoch. Or the
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agent may choose to set dZ;(t) equal to the available quantity at the current
market rate. If the agent chooses z;(t), then the price is random.
    Iftheagentchooses r.,then dZl(t) and Zi(t) becomerandom. However,
when the agent qttotes his prices to the broker, the agent can specify the
maximttm quantities which he will trade at his prices: dZr(t) and Z2*(t) are
bounded from above. A pair ofvariables {Sl(t),S,'(t)} or {Zi"(t),Z,"(t)} become
yandom variables, depending on what action the agent takes.
    Since the transitioR probabilitles of the marke£ rates are intractable with
our arrival model, we have only the expected time paths of the market rates
avai}able. Because of this limitation, wheit we calculate the expected profit,
we restrict feaslble actions of the fziture to the sma}ler set aRd find aR optimal
action from this smaller set.
    A(4 - 6): When £he agent calculates the expected profit, the set of valttes
    which Sr(t) and S,'(t) caR take consists only of 6.(t) and 6b(t).
    The decision variables for the optimization are the desired values. In
order to derive the expected profit, we replace Si(t), S2(t), Zi(t), and Z2(t) in
equation (4- 1) by their desired valties. A(4 -2) determines the expected values
of Ri(t), for i= 1, 2. With given 6(t), 7 G r aitd A(4 - 2), and using (4 - 1), at
epoch to, the conditional expec£ation of the profit over interval [to,T] ls taken
with regard to Ri(t) and R2(t) aitd is given by
      E[ il[to,T]Ior,Jft,] == E[ l3 si(t)dzs(t)- yfge sr(t)dzr(t) Ior, ir,,]
                          +Ylff4.(t)d(E[R2(t)])-Y(geCb(t)d(E[Ri(t)])
                             +c{fi2(T-to)+Bi(T-te)}
                      = E[ 71ge SS(t) dZ5(t) - .llge Sl(t) dzf(t) Ior, Jc},]
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                         + B2 y(3 ca (t) dt - Bi y(IT 6b(t) dt
                             +c{32(T-to)+Bi(T-to)}･
Ri afid R2 are raRdom measures. Derivations of their expected values use
Campbell's Theorem.5 IR additioR, the derivation of the last three terms uses
properties of the compound Poissok process.
      E[fi{to,T]I7,Jrc},] = .Ei7[y[Tl si(t)dzs(t) - J(LT sr(t)dzl(t)I7, i},]
                       + (P2 - fii) Y[jr C(t) dt + (c + u) (B2 + Pi)(T - to ), (4 - 3)
where4(t)=E[Y(t)lT},] and rsim-aiE[C]=:JURi(t)dt,fori=l,2.
            4.4. MAXIMIZATION OF EXPECTED PROFIT
    The agent's actloR may iBflueRce 6(t), dependiRg on the quantity the
agent wants £o trade. We rule this oat by introduclng ait analogy of perfect
competition by assuming
    A(4 - 7): 6(t) is xot infl=enced by r.
Moreover, we assume
    A(4 - 8): The agent is risk neutral.
    Since the agent does not have coRtrols over the last two terms of equation
(4 - 3), profit maximization is equlvaleRt to maximiziBg the fust term. We use
assumptioRs from A(4 - 1) to A(4 - 8). The puypose of assuming A(4 - 6) is to
narrow the set of feasEble actions. With glveR daylight and ovemigkt limits, a
given expected time path and a given set of feasible actioRs, at each epoch, the
agent wants to maximize the expected profit of the rest ofthe day by choosing
    5See Daley and Vere-Jones, 1989, p. 188, the expected valtte of the ran-
dom integral.
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the best actions either from rh or r., i.e., by choosing the desired values for
Zi and Z2, or by choosing his quotations Sr(t) and ss(t).
  s;,s,'M,zl･:ii,ziErE[ fi[to,T] lJrclt,]
   :s;,sge.it.s.,.,,-E][YCTI Si(t)dZi(t)-ylgs,'(t)dzxt) li},]+constaRt (4-4)
subject to
  -LSZi'(t)-Z2'(t)+io+Ri(t)-R2(t)SL for te[to,T] (daylightlimit)
        Zi'(T)-Z2'(T)+zo+Ri(T)-R2(T)=O, (overnightlimit)
where xo = Z(to).
    First we consider the case where an expected time paeh c(t) ls monoton-
ica}ly increasing and rises by more thaR the bid-ask spread by the end of the
day. Second we consider the case where 6(t) does not increase or decrease by
more than the bld-ask spread. The results obtained in tkese examples of the
shape of 6(t) will be applied to the cases where 6(t) has more complicated
shapes.
    A(4 - 9): The agent expects that the exchange rate w!ll go ttp by more
    tkan the bid-ask spread: At epoch to,there is an intervai [to,[Ib] such that
    g{ll,)> o, for ie <t< Cl"b and eb(T) > Ca(to)･
    We want to solve the maximization prob}em (4 - 4), assuming A(4 - 9).
We solve it in three steps. First, we Iimit the actioR to the set rh and find the
optimal ac£ioR from rh. Second, we solve the problem by using actions from
the set r.. Third, we compare the results of the fust and the second steps and
find £he over-all optimal action.
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    Using actions of the subset rh implies that we choose Zr(t) and Z2"(t),
and that Sl(t) and SS(t) become random variables whose expected values are
exogenously given. By shifting the starting epoch, the maximizatiell problem
(4 - 4) is equivalent to the following problem.
Optimization over Th: Under A(4 - 9) aRd with to = O,
.in
,{}ir, E [y(IT ss (t) dz,' (t) - ygT s," (t) dz,･ (t) l A,]
              =,m,a,x,{y[Tgb(t)dz,'(t)-JtgTc.(t)dzxt)} (4-s)
subject to
                     (1ii!l/!tl/iiLi-2oL, for ostsT
solution: If we express the solution in the form of the four coordinate vectors,
{Si' (t), Si (t), Zi* (t), Zi (t)}, then it is given by
 { Ca(t) , 4b(t) ,( L- Z(t))" + Zi(t), (-L + Z(t))" + Z2(t) }, for t E[O,T),
                                                              (4 - 7)                    {6a(t),eb(t), Zi(t) , Z(t) },fort==T,
where (x)+ i!i max{O,x }. The solution implies maintaining£he longest position
and selllng at the last epoch. The solutioR means that qtiaRtities to trade,
dependiRg on the actua} positioR, are as follow.
                 dzi(t)=[2iiO.(,))+ ig;to=.:O,isT,
                            (4 - 6)
                 dzi(t) :(2?,gt)-L)" igl.9m.<b5T;
         '
In (4 - 6), dZr(O) == L - zo means to make the posl£ion longest by hittlng the
offered rate. dZr' (t) = (L - Z(t))", for t G (O, T], means £hat if the daylight Iimit
on the long position becomes lax due to retail selling, then the ageRt hits the
offered rate and puts the position back to t}}e longest. dZ2'(t) = (Z(t) - L)+
means that if the position jumps out above the dayllght limlt due to retall
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buying, then the agent hits the bid rate to sell and bring the position back to
the daylight limit. dZ,`(T) = Z(T) means that the agent sells all he has by
hitting the bid ra£e.
    If we use r.,then we kave te specify what happeRs ifthe agent's quotation
is not hit by the next arrivals. One policy is that the agent keeps quoting
the market rate whenever the arrivals of the other agents change the market
rate. Another poiicy is that the agent walts on a given market rate until
the arrivals change the market rates &nd then the agent hits someone else's
quotat!on. In order to choose a policy among those possib}e policles, we need
transition pyobabilities of bid and offered rates. The transltion probabllities
are intractable with our model foy the arrival processes which is developed in
           'a later chapter.6 We introduce an assumption about how the ageRt organizes
his idea:
    A(4 - lo): When the offered rate is hit, bid and offered rates jump upward
    by o, v or 2v with equal probabllities, while maintaiRing the bid-ask spread
    at v.
With ehis assxmption, we compare the expected profits ef actioRs which are
elemeRts of rh aRd r.. Let 7i be the solution (4-6) for epoch O; 7i ii {dZr(t) ==
L - zo} be a policy. Let 72 be an actioR such that {Sl(t) = B(t)} and refer to
{72,7i} as a policy. This meaRs that in order to buy the agent waits once
and if his quotation is not hit, then he hits the offered ra£e. We want to
compare policy {or2,7i} with poiicy {7i}. The latter means to hit the offered
rate immediately. If the agent chooses or2 aRd hls quotation is hit, then his
profit is larger than the act!on 7i by amount v(=- a - b). If his quotation is not
hit, then market rates shlft upward aRd he hits £he Rew offered rate. Then his
    6For cletails see in Section 6.2.
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profit is Iarger than {ori}, by O,-v and -2v with equal probabilities. Let 6 be the
probability that the b!d rate is hit by the next arrival. 1-i is the probability
that the offered rate is hit by the next arrival. To simplify the argument, we do
not consider the case where the next arriva} renews, instead of hitting, one of
the market rates. The expected difference ofthe profitfrom {72,7i}, compared
with {7i}, is given by 5v +(1-6){ge + g(-v)+g(-2v)} = 5v+(1 -s)v : (26 - 1) < o,
because being bullish means 6 < k. Thls means that {7i} is better than {or2,7i}･
    Next, considey policy {or2,72,ori}. As before we use assumption A(4 - lo)
and assume that the transition probabilities remaik the same at the fust and
second transitloRs. We extend our ana}ysis backward. We have already fouRd
that {7i} is better than {or2,7i}. We apply this result on the last two actions
of {72,72,7i}･ Then {72,7i} is bettey than {72,or2,k}. When we assume the
transitioR probabllities as !it A(4-10), any policy using actions from r. cannot
be better than {7i}.
    Depending on the transition probabilities, it may be possible that a policy
which consi$ts ofsome actiops from T. (quot!ng both market rates most ofthe
time, and quotlRg only one of the rates to square a positlon sometimes) has a
higher expected profit than {7i} in the example of bullish expectatlon A(4 - 9).
Since we can Bot derive £he traRsition probabilities of the market rates using
ouy model, we do not pursue an optlmal policy of using r. when the agent
has bu}lish expectatioR A(4 - 9). [I]o coficlude the comparison of the expected
profits by iising actions either from Th or r., we present the solntioit for (4 - 5)
as an assumptlon.
    A(4 - ll): If the ageBt has a bulllsh expectation such that, for O <t < T,
    dCit)>O aBd l6(T)-6(O)I>2u,theRtheageRtchooses{I"h}tosolve
    optimization problem of (4 - 5).
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    So far assumption A(4 - 9) was used. Next we will replace A(4 - g) with
the assumption that the agent's expectation is neither bul}ish nor bearish and
will solve the optimizatien preblem (4 - 4). As in the bullish case, we solve the
optimizatioR by using actioRs first from Th and second from r.and compare
the result to choose tke overall solut!on.
    A(4 - 12): The agent does ltot expect the exchange rate te move more
    than the bid-ask spread for a whi}e. Namely at epoch to, there exists an
    interva}[to,[z-b]suchthat dCi')=o or dCit)gGObut ltg(CZ-b)-tS(te)l<2u.
    First, we app}y actions from rh. The ttse of rh inr}plies that transaction
prices are set equal to expected values of the bid and offered rates: Si(t) = 4.(t)
and S2(t)=4b(t). TheR,wehave AT6b(t)dZ,*(t)---.Ill6.(t)dZ{(t)<O, for
any dZ,'(t) >O aRd dZ,"(t) > O, because by A(4-12), 6b(ti) <6.(t2), for any
ti,t2 E [to,T]. The ageRt does not have positive profit if he uses actlons from
rh･
    Next, we consider using r.. Actions from r. imply choosing va}ues for
Si'(t) and Si(t). Zr(t) and Z,*(t) are now random variables: z,'(t) = zf(t), for
i -- l,2. When we use r., Z{(t) and Z,'(t) become raRdom measures. Besides
of making dlfferent varSables random, there is another difference between rh
and r.. If we use Vh , the coRstraint on the position at the eRd of the
day z'(T) = e can be a}most surely met. On the other hand, Z*(T) =O
can be achieved only randomly, if we use r.. IR this case, instead of the
constraint Zth(T) = O , we introduce a itegative final reward or penalty for the
open position. The penalty depeRds on lZ(T)l aRd is zero, if Z(T) ==O. Let
the (2L+1)×1 vector 9¥lr denote a fiRal reward at epoch Tsuch that ;iYin,.
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means the ith element of the V9) and that
                   ;tYlr,.= ltVjZr,-.<e, for i=1,...,L,
                   WIT,e -- C･
By shifting the origin of the time axis by to and setting ie == O , we solve the
followiRg problem:
Optimizatlon ever r.: With assumption A(4 - 12),
           ,mr fl,;1; E [yC' ss (t) dzl (t) in y[T sf (t) dzf (t) -t- pt'zr( z(t) )l a,]
           -- ,}¥. p,E. {ygT ss (t) dE[zi (t)] - ,/[T sf (t) dE[zi (t)]
               +E[Wli'( Z(t) )l [}o] }･ (4h8)
subject to
                      lZ'(t)lsL, for est-< T.
solution: This is a model of a controlled, contin"okis time Markov process
with finite states. We look for all optimal policy amoRg the time invariant
policies. The positioR Z(t) is the state in this model. Each jump from
one state to another which sigRifies a traitsaction has aB associated reward
which signlfies profit. A model presented iR Ytishkevich (1977) ls appllcable.
{-L,...,O,...,L} is the state space. State Z(t) jumps wheR the arrival of a
bttyer or sel}er occurs. The arriva} process is a Poisson process and hence the
inter-arrival time follows an exponential distribution. We have to construct
an infinitesimal state transition matrix. SiRce we work in continEtous time                                                                  '
we have an infinltesimal matrlx instead of a matrlx of traRsitloR probabillties.
Let Q betheinfinitesimal matrix. Ass"mption A(4-12), d6i,t) =o, implies
that the arrival intensities of buyers and sellers are the same and we limit the
values of Sr and S2sk such that dCd(,t) =o.'Let q bethearrivalintensity of
the seller or buyer. This is the iR£ensity that Z(t) moves to another state.
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    A(4 - 13): Each arrival trades either one or two enits.7
    Let vi and v2 bethe probabi}ities that abuyer orseller wantsto trade
one unit and two uRits, conditional on the arrival. Let (? bethe indnitesimal
transition matrix. Using the notation and assumptions given above, q is
written as                            -1 vl v2 O O
                             1 -2 vl v2 O                  Q=gAii!g v2 vi -2 vi v2 (4-9)                             O v2 vl -2 1
                             O O V2 V: -i
Among the elements of q, e2i and Q4s equal 1. Because of the daylight limit
L =r 2,the agent trades only one unit, even if the aryival wants to trade two
units. The first row of Q meansthat Z(t)=2 originally andthe state z(t)
jttmps to z(t)=1 wlth condltional probability vi or to Z(t) :O wlth v2.
    Each jump is associated with a reward. A jump from Z =2 to z =1
( Z = O) means one ianit (two units) of sale. The expected reward when z = 2
is given by vi+2v2, usingtke bid-ask spread asthe unit for measuring yevenue.
An upward jump from Z = -2 to, say, Z = -1 is one unit of purchase which
incurs cost. We do Rot have to assign a negative reward £o the purchasejump.
Except for the last downward jump or the last consecut!ve jtimps dowmvard
before the end ofthe day, the downwardjump of Z a}ready signifies a profit,
notjust revenue. Let the 5×l vector R be the vector ofthe expectetl rewards
ofjumps, i.e.,
                                 vl + 2v2
                                 vl + 2v2                         RIil2ug yi+2v2 . (4-10)
                                    1
                                    o
    Let the 5×1 vector I,V(t) denote the expected profit between epocht
and the end ofthe day T. The i-th element of W(t) is the expected profit
    7This automatically implies that for an individua} agent's day}ight lirnit
L -< 2 for every agent.
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the agent has if the state is a£ the i-th state at epoch t. In our model, the
first element of W(t) corresponds to Z = 2. The expected profit $atisfies the
following differeRtial equation and is obtaiRed as the solution ofthe differential
equation (Yttshkevich l977, Corollary 3.2 and Sttpplementary Remarks 5.),
                        W'(t)=-R-qW(t) (4-11)
with the boundary condition W(T)= Win. (4- H) is an example of BellmaR's
eqttation. The elements of R aRd Q are constaRt. Since the sum of the
elements in each row of Q is zero, Q is singular. The sol"tion of (4-11) is
given by
                       w(o)= (yCT e'qds)R+ wzr (4-i2)
where esq ii! f+ iiS/l + S-£{il/->Z + (S3q,. )3 +...+ ('2t)k +.... Since q is Rot invertibie,
the expressioll for Jg" e"Qds cannot be simplified. Jff e'Qds =: T(I+ !I}9/ +(T3Q., )2 +
!1.Zl{pt/ +...+(TQk)!k--i+...).
    Nexe we find optimal quotations Sf alld Ss. Since we have already
limltedourargumenttothecasewhere Etl{liE:t, =O, findiRg Sr and Ss isthe
same as finding the optimal bid-ask spread 2u'. The arrival intensity of a
buyer aRd that of a sel}er ls g. The value of g depends on the spread. As
shown in (4 - 10), R is also a fuRction of u. The value of u whlch maximizes
(4-12) is the optimal spread. Substitnte g = f(u) and (4- 10) into (4- l2) aRd
differentiate wlth respect to u. Since ( J3i" esQds )R= T(ql+ gLC {tik2..tT!A>+ stC/ Ilyl-X}T !A) +
...
+2L/Zkf?E:IT A.,) i+...)u2v, where VEii ±. R and (? =gA;
    ilt7[ y(]T e"QdsR l
      .. T{ fgt +(TGA )g, + (Tg4/ )2q' + (TgS)3g' +...+ (T(qkA-)kigiq' +... }.2v
             +T{ +gi+ q( T2g!A)+ g( T3q.,A )2 +...+ q(TqkA! )kmi +... }2v
              .,, ITeTQq'u+q( y[T esQds )}2v (4- l3)
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The optima} value of u makes (4-13) equal to zero. TeTq and Jg" esqds become
proportional to T, as T- oo. (4- l3) can be solved for T= oo.
     ete is the probability distributlon ofthe state ln which Z would stay
at epoch t, starting at epoch O from one of the states. The row gives the
starting state and the colunm gives the state at epoch t. etQ converges
to a stationary distribntion, as t - oo. Let C be the statioRary distri-
bution which is associated with Q, i.e., C = limt-ooe'9 .We can show
that "Jlii'es9ds also coRveygesto C. Foragiven e>O,,thereexists
r such thaqletq-CU < ff for t> r. Il･U represents the maximumab-
solute value of the individual elements of a matrix. Using the faces that
lJlle"qds =lJUe'Qds+}#e"Qds and lJlie'qds-C= "Jli(e"q-C)ds, wehave
limat-..oo " Jlj (e"Q - C)ds = limt.-.oo l JU" (e"Q --- C)ds +Iimt-.o }#(e'e - C)ds. Because
}imtin....Il}JU'(e'Q-C)dsll--O and limtig.IlfLi(eS9-C)dsllslimteq."#ll(e"Q-
C)lldssc, wehave llfJlieSeds-CllsE and
                     ,ttm.. -I Ji[` eSqds =C=,ttm.. etijds (4-i4)
Divide (4 - 13) by T, let T - oo , aRd iR (4 - 14) replace t by T, then (4 - 13)
becomes zero, if g'u+g =O.Let q =f(tt).8 Then the necessary conditioR for
the optima} spread u' for the asymptotic case is given by
                             f'u+f=O. (4-15)
The optimal quo£atioRs are giveR by Sf -- C(t)-u' and S5 -- C(t)+u', where
C(t) is assumecl to satisfy A(4 - 12).
    8The explicit form of f(u) will be derived in Section 6.5.
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    The solution to the optimizatioit problem wheR we assume A(4-12) belong
to r. and the solution is as follows. If IZ(t)l E{ L,then
  { 6(t)- u', 6(t)+ u', ( L- Z(t) )" + Zi(t), ( L -}- Z(t) )" + Z2(t) }. (4 - 16 - a)
If IZ(t)l > L ,then
  { C(t)+ u', 6(t)- u', (-L- Z(t))' + Zi(t), (-L+ Z(t))" + Z2(t) }. (4 - 16- b)
(4 - l6 - a) implies that the agent walts on the market rates and that the
associated quantities are the maximum quantities within the daylight limit.
(4 - 16 - b) corresponds to a situation such that the daylight limit is violated
by yetail transactions. (4 - i6 - b) lmpiles that if the positioR moves beyoRd
the daylight limit due to retail transactions, the agent hits one of the market
rates to put the position back to the level of the daylight limit. IR order for
(4 - l6 - b) to be implemented, we Beed the exlsteace of market makers who
quote their prices unti} the last epoch as is assumed in A(4 - 5).
    So far the magnitzide of the maximum open positionis exogenously given
as the daylight limit. If the size of the limit on the opeR positioR is also a
choice variable, it is posslble that a voluntary limit which the agent cheoses
is smaller than £he exogenously given daylight limit. Depending on YV'lr, this
caR happen. r]]he expected profit (4 - 12) coRsists of two £erms. It can be
proved that with iRfiniteslmal matrix e as in (4-g), (Jgre"Qds)R increases
as the daylight }lmit L iRcreases. The negative elements of WZr, which are
penalties on the open positlon at T, may decrease more than proportionately
as L iRcreases; for example, VVEr :(-22,-1,o,-1,-22)T.9 }Iad this been the
case for finlte T, we will have a trade-off between (Jg'e"qds)R and wlr･ as
    9Superscript T means traRspose.
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L increases. So the voluBtary limit may be smaller than the daylight limit
L. This situation matches empirical observations that traders rarely assume
an epen positioA up to the daylight limits. We will not pursRe this pessibility
here.
                      4.5. ePTIMAL POLICY
    In the preceding sectioR, xve solved the optimization problem w!th the
assumptions A(4 - 9) and A(4 - 12). 6(t) was assumed to be monotonically
iRcreasing A(4-9), or more or less horizontal, compared with the bid-ask spread
A(4 - 12). Next, we want to consider the case where 4(t) has local maxima or
minima. Before we do that, we need to provlde the notation for the sets of
actioits inc}uding the solutions of (4 - 4) and (4 - 8);
       rht iii { 6a(t), 4b(t), (L - Z(t))" + Zi(t), (-L + Z(t))" + Z2(t)} (4 - 17 - a)
       rh,E-i:{e.(t),gb(t),(-L-Z(t))"-l-Zi(t),(L+Z(t))"+Z2(t)} (4-l7-b)
       rhgiii{4a(t),gb(t),(-Z(t))++Zi(t),(Z(t))++Z2(t) } (4-l7-c)
      rhi2 iii { 6.(t), 4b(t), (-L - Z(t))" + Zi(t), (-L + Z(t))" + Z2(t)} (4 - 17 - d)
       I".iiii{6b(t),.,(L-Z(t))++Zi(t), ----- }(4-17-e)
       Tw2EiE{･i6a(t), Mm-- ,(L-FZ(t))+-i-Z2(t)}(4-l7-f)
      rwi2 ee { 6b(t), Ca(t), ( L- Z(t) )" -i- Zi(t), ( L+ Z(t) )" + Z2(t)(}{ - 17 - g)
    rht means that the agent tries to maintain the longest positlon by hitting
the market rates. rh, means doing the same to rr}aintaiR the shoTtest position.
For both rhi and Th,, the quan£ities in the coordinates of zr(t) and Zi(t)
are the quantlties abotit which the agent Rotifies the broker together with his
quotatlons. These c"iantlties are the maximum quantlties which the ageRt
trade$ athis quotations. dZ,'(t)= (L-Z(t))' of(4-17-a) ancl dZ2"(t)= (L+
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Z(t))+ of (4- 17-b) aye the maximum chaRges ofthe positlon while the daylight
limitismet. dZ,'(t)= (-L+Z(t))" of(4-17-a)and dZ,'(t)= (-L-Z(t))' of
(4 - 17 - b) are the mSAimum quaRtities needed te put the position back to the
daylight limit. rh, means maintaining a square position by hitting the market
rate, if the position deviates from O. rhi2 means keep2ng the pesition at the
daylight limit by hkting the market rate, if the position deviates outside the
daylight limit.
    r.i and r.2 mealt waitlRg on one of the market rates until the daylight
I!mit becorr}es bindlng; r.i to have the long position aRd r.i to have the
short position. T.i2 means to wait on the both mayket rates. The expressions
in the coordiRates for Zl(t) and Z5(t) in (4-17-g) are the maximum quaRtities
which the ageRt trades at his quotations which are equtal to the expected bid
and offered rates by assumptioR A(4-6). If Z(t)= L, then rwi2 becomes
dZi'(t)= O and dZ,'(t) :2L and£he agent quo£es 6.(t) oRly. If Z(t)=-L,
then r.i2 becomes dZr(t)=2L and dZ2'(t) =O, whichimplies that the agent
quotes 6b(t) only.
    Solution (4 - 7) consists o£ rht, for t E [O,[Z-'), and Th,, for t = T. SolgtioR
(4 - 9) consists of r.i2 anel rhi2, for t E [C,T). Since so}utions (4 - 9) assign
an action to each epoch, contingent on the actual posltien, solutlons (4 - 9)
represent a policy. A summary of the agent's choices of action is as fo}}ows.
    Bu}lish (A(4 - 9) is the case): The agent hits £he offered rate, buys until
    the dayllght limit becomes binding aitd quotes an expected offered rate
    for the eRd of the monotone period, 6.(T), as his selling prlce, ie., rht.
                                                             (4 - l8)
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Bearish (counterpart of A(4- 9)): ']]he agent hits the asked rate, sells the
maximum quantity which the daylight limit allows and now quotes eb(T)
as his buyiRg price, i.e., rh,.
                                                         (4 - 19)
otherwise : The agent quotes both the bid and the asked rates at the
same time unless the daylight limit is binding. If it is binding, then the
agent quotes only one ofthe rates, I',.i2, I"wi or I'w2･
                                                         (4 - 20)
    We want to consider more var!atioBs of the shape of the expected time
path besides a monotonica}ly increasing oRe (A(4- 9)) or a flat oBe (A(4 -12)).
Suppose that 4(t) is bullish iR the sense of A(4 - 9) until epoch T and that after
r, 6(t) becomes horizoRtal. For interva} [O,r), the optimization problem (4 - s)
is applicable. At epoch r, the expected profit increases by choosiRg to wait
oR 6.(t) rather than hittiBg the bld rate cb(t). Using the notatioRs defined in
(4 - 17), the solution policy is given by {rhi, fortE[O,T); r.2, fort :T }.
    Next, suppose that 6(t) is bullish before r and bearish after r in the sense
of A(4 - 9). The horizons for the optimizatioR are dlvided lnto three periods,
name}y [O,r), r and (T,T]. TheR, we have solution
   {rht, for tE[O,T)l r.2, foy t= rl rh,, for tE(T,T)i rhg, for t =T}.
    An example is shown in Fig=re 2. c(t) has a local extremum at ti, a loca}
minimum at t2 aRd the globa} maxim£tm at epoch T. Buying att == o and selling
&t T is not optimal. If the ageRt divides the horizons iRto interval$ where 6(t)
is monotone and chooses the optimal actlon in each interval, then the ageBt
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has a larger expected profit thaR by bllying at t= o and selling at T. ']rhis is
because by £he successive optimizations of the individual intervals, the agent
takes advantage of all of le(ti) - c(ti+D l rather than just l q(T) - C(to) l. The
solution for the case of Figure 2 is glven by {rhi, for tG {O,tD; rw2, for t ==
ti; rh,, for tG(6,t2); Twi, fbr t =t2; rhi, for tE(t2,T); rhg, for t=T }.
    So far the expected time path c(t) has beeR given. However, the expected
time path e(t) may change its slope from time to tlme, since the system which
determines the exchange rate in the market is non-stationary. Also, as the
agent contlnuously updates and refiBes the information j[}, he may recognize
Rew locai maxima or minima as FLE while the previoiisly known extremum
still remains unchanged. As the precedlng example showed, the agent can
increase his profit by taking advantage of local minima oy maxima. An optlma}
policy is that, as the agent recognizes local minima and maxlma of 6(t), he
should take advantage of such updated FLE values and concentrate oB the
optimization of the current interval.
    The optimal policy implies that, for a giveR epock, the ageng's action
depends on FLE values and not on any other extrema of the expected time
path c(t). [rhe fact that the action depends on FLE values gives a rationale
why, ln Chapter 6, a tlistribution functioR is assigned to the agents' FLE values
for a glveR epoch. Since the FLE va}ue determines an indivldual agent's action,
by specifying an FLE dlstribution function, we can obtain a distribution ofthe
ageRts' actions at a given epoch.
    The optimal policy derived here coincides with the rules of thumb in the
foreign exchange btisiRess. Judging whether the price has reached the bot£om
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or the ceiling based oR observations is an important skill for traders who work
in the actual foreign exchaRge markets.
                4.6. [I]WO STATES OF EXPECTATION
    So far the ageRt has made decisions using expected values. However, an
agent does not always have a c}ear i(lea about which way the traRsaction price
will go. Heye we redefine two sta,tes of an ageRt's level of confideRce about his
expected FLE value.
State of the firosted g}ass: Based oll the ageRt's informatioR, the transaction
price may jump in either dlrection. The agent does Rot assu[[{e aR open posi-
tion.
State of the crystal glass; [rhe agent thinks that his predlcted FLE va}ue !s
accurate eaough to assume an open position.
As is shown in Flgure 3, the agent moves between states of frosted and cyystal
glass as he receives news and observes the arrival process.
    Our mode} uses only the expected va}ues, not varlances, and assumes the
ageRt is risk neutral. We need an additional assumption, if we want to explain
why the agents do not always assume the opeR positlons. The crlterioR of
baRkrtiptcy avoldance is introduced.
    A(4 - i3)(bankruptcy avoidance): r]]he agent always rRaintaiRs the proba-
    bility of bankruptcy below a glven leve}.
In other words, the a,geRt does not speculate, if the probabi}lty of caeastrophic
loss exceeds a givei3 level. The rationale ofthis criterion is that ollce bankrupt,
an agent cannot recover, aBd that eveft a hiRt of risky operatlons by the bank
for which the agent works can cause a rtm oi} the bank by its customers.
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    If the agent's expectatioR about the exchange rate is associated with
a large variance, theR the agent will Rot assume aR opeR position, even !f
the action he is coRsidering has a pesitive expected profit. Iit this case, the
probabillty of catastrophic loss from an open position of even one tyansaction
ttRit exceeds the glven level. [l]he criterion of baitkrttptcy avoidance is binding
even wkh an open position of one trallsactioll unit.
    Bankrikptcy avoidance is also applied to the management of the agen£'s
bank. This results iR dayllght and overnight limlts whlch are exogenously
given to the agent from the rr}anagement of his bank.
                 4.7. LIMITATION OF THE MODEL
    When the agent assumes an opeit positien based on his bullish or bearish
expectations, the optimal positionis at the maximgm magnitude within the
daylight limit. This is not what is observed in reality. By assuming risk
neutrality, our model cannot make an intermediate opeR positien the optimal
position. Introducing a vo}untary limit while maintaining the assumption of
risk neutrality remaiRs to be done.
5. HETEROGENEOUSINFORMATION
    Bi}lions of activities in the econoray all over the wor}d geRerate the de-
mand and suppiy of the foreign exchange. KRowledge about individual eco-
nomic activitles of the past and the preseRt is summarlzed. The GNP measure
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is an example. Pieces of knowledge may besummarized and analyzed and come
out as econometric forecasts. We interpret information as an a-field generated
by a collection of pieces of knowledge. Knowledge about eachindividual activ-
ity constitutes an infinite set. This !nfinite set of pieces of knowledge is covered
by a finite number of subsets. Each subset aBd the family of the unions and
                       ,intersections of these sttbsets is called information. Information is a a-field of
iRformational sttbsets. Knowing a specific informational subset does not mean
knowing aR element of the subset unless the element itself is the informational
subset. For examp}e, the agent may know the GNP value for a quarter, but he
may not kBow the exact figures of each component. Some of the informational
subsets are specific to individual agents. In this regard, an example in our
model is the arrival of retail customers to the individual agents. Since arrlva}
processes in the market depend on the degree of disagreement among agents
with respect to expectations, agents try to estimate what others are expect-
ing. Agents may disagree in their estimates. They may have equally refined
infermatioR butthe information ls heterogeneous. It is not meaningfu} to state
that the agene has a}l the information to estimate the iktra-day movement of
the exchaRge rate. We use a, eo denote the ageRt's information at epoch to.
    The information which enters the agent's declsion making is grouped in
the following four types:iO
 (1) Statistical data which are released by public and private institutions.
 (2) Aggregate retai} demaRd and supply of the day.
 (3) Identity of buyers and sellers. Agents may take different actions to spec-
    ulate, clepending oB their daylight limits and eheir retail customers.
    'OThis list is drawn from Oguchi (1983).
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 (4) General news, such as the Fed fund rate, Euro dollar interest rates or
    political news.
    The agents have heterogeneous information (in the sense of the informa-
tional subsets) o£ the second agd third type of informatioR. In general, agents
do not know other ageRts' retail transactions, which can be substantial and
variable. Also, some agents may have more refined information for types two
and three than other agents. RefiRed iRformation of these types helps agents
to form more accurate forecasts about the arrivals of buyers and sellers. We
can interpret £hls klnd of the heterogeneity of information as a difference in
the number of variables which an individual agent's econometric models uses.
Suppose that the first agent's ecoRometric model contains variables Xi,...,X.
aRd Yi. The second agent's mode} contains Xi,...,X. and Yb apd so forth.
A model for all overall market contains Xi,...,X. and Yl,...,X,. Indlvidual
agents' forecasts can be different but equally accura£e on average.
    As for the fust and fourth types of infoymation, the ageRts may have
heterogeneous iRterpretatioRs for given news. AgeRts try to analyze how other
agents interpret Rews with regard to forelgn exchange rates. Since an agent can
take advantage of fluctuatlons in the exchange rate, whatever the cause, ana-
Iyzing other ageRts' responses to the news is as important as j"dgiRg whether
those responses are consistent with the agent's econometric analysis.
    There are examples to tel} how the agents' responses infiaence the ex-
change rates (see Oguchi, 1983).
 (1) Economic indicators which infiuence the exchaRge rates wheR their data
    are re}eased vary.
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 (2) If the newly yeleased data of the indicators coiRcide with the agents'
    expectations, there is little response in the market.
 (3) EveR ifthe release ofthe data concerning some econom!c indicators does
    Rot cause reactions iR the market immediately, k ls not uRusual that later
    exchange rate ix{oves in a dlrection which coincides wlth what the agent's
    econometric model predicts.
    The first and third types ofiRformation seem to indicate either that agents
are not rational or that a course of events depeRds on history.ii Whatever
the case, for given economic indicators whlch are currently infiuentlal in the
market, the agents are ragional wlth regard to maxlmizing daily profits.
6. ARRIVAL PROCESSES OFBUY RSANDSELLERS
             6.1. DISTRIBUTIONS FeR TE{E ENSEMBLE
    It was shown iR Chapter 4 how FLE values and daylight limi£ determine
an iRdividual agekt's optlmal pollcy. Here in Chapter 6, we consider the col-
lective actions of a large number of agents. [I]he ageBts are heterogeneous with
respect to expected FLE values aRd daylight limits as well as retaikransac-
tions. The traRsitions of expectatioits take place intermittently among the
agents and so do arrivals ef agents. Each arrlval has his expec£ed FLE value
    iiln the sense that who responds fiyst aRd hew may determine the actions
of the other agents.
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and we assign a distributioR function over all these values. Also, we assign
distribution functions to the lengths of time during which agents stay in each
state of expectation. With these distribution functions we can derive ehe dis-
tribution of the actions which the ageRts may take at a given epoch. The
agents represent a statistical ensemble.
    We assume that when an agent determines the FLE value, it is arandom
drawing from a distributioR which exists at that epoch. Let Xt be a FLE value
which is chosen by an agent who revised his expec£atiog at epoch t. Let Gt(x)
be the disty!but!on functioR from which Xt ls drawn. At any epoch, there is a
sample o£ Xt's of £hose who have already arrived bnt have not yet }eft. Their
quotations are dlstr!buted over some range. Let Xti, fbr i-- 1,...N,,i2 be such
FLE va}"es at epoch t. Let Ht(x) be a sample distribution of Xti's at epoch t.
The agents who are approximated by Ut(x) are the oRes that are waiting on
their qttotations. For a given t, Gt(x) is the dlstributlon function from which
xt of a new arrival is drawn, while Ht(x) is the sample distributlon of x, of
those who have a}ready arrived and are quoting in the market. Gt(x) and Ht(x)
          'shift from .time to time and have supports which are subsets of st,. A}though
xt takes only positive integer valties, we approximate the true Gt(x) and fft(x)
by absol"tely contlnuous fkmctlons.
    Besides the degree of heterogeiteity for FLE va}ues, agents, as a statistica}
ensemble, are also characterized by the frequency of revisions of their expec-
tations. ABother expression of the frequency of the revision ls }ength of tlme
duriRg which an agent malntaiRs the same expectations. We asstime £hat the
    i2Definltion of N, is given below.
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lengths of time duriRg whlch individual agents stay in the frosted and crystal
states follow exponential distributioRs.
    A(6 - 1): The traRsition between the twe states is an alternating renewal
    process whose renewal epechs follow exponential distributions.
    Let fi(t) =eiexp(-eit) and h(t)= e2exp(-e2t) bethe density functions
for the length of time t dvtring which individual agents stay in the frosted aRd
crystal state, respectively. TheR, the expected lengths of the stays are glven
by dr and ±. Let N be the tota} number of agents in this economy which
is exogenously given and let Nf and N. denote the numbers of agents who
stay ln the frosted state and in the crystal state for a given epoch. Then,
their expected numbers are glven by E[Nf]= whe,e+"e,N and E[IVc]= iT,t}g;+e,N}
respectively.
    For given coRstaltts ei and e2, the expected number of agents ln each
state at a given epoch is constant. However, the agents may chaltge values.
Some of the ageRts who have been quoting leave, and new arrivals jolR the
existlng ageRts. If Ct(x) = Ht(x), we say that the heterogeneity is stationary.
Otherwise,wesaythattheheterogelleityisnon-stationary.If Ge(x)#llo(x),
theB Ut(x) shiftssothat lfft(x)-Gt(x)l-+O, forany xGst,, as t---,oo,
becaEtse of the ageBts' changing values.
                  6.2. BIDDING AT THE BROKER
    Only one broker exlsts in a local forelgn exchange market. Suppose that
&t a given epoch,the (luotakions of buying aRd selling prices exist as iR F"igure
4. Among the exlsting quotations, the broker announces the maximum buying
price and the minimtim selllng price to all the agents. A}though A(t) ancl B(t)
are known to every agent, ageRts do not kRow how the ether quotatioits are
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distributed. The agent arrives at the market with his expected FLE vaiue.
Depending on his valRe, he chooses an action from rht, rh, or rwi2･
    Suppo$e that the next arrlval hits B(t) of Figure 1. B(t) may remain at
Bi, jump to B2, or even to B3, depending on the quantities associated with
ehe arrival and Bi aBd B2. If the agent who quoted Bi was using rwi when
hit, then A(t) may jttmp up as he switches to r.i2, depending on which is
the moye competitive, Ai or the agent's selling price. If the ageRt who quoted
Bi was using r.i2, theR A(t) will not jump up. Besides this complication of
traRsitioRs of the market yates, quotatioRs are cancelled as agents move from
the crystako the frosted-glass state from time to time. While we caR derive
the expected time path of the market rates, the transition pyobabilities of the
market rates are intractab}e.
                    6.3. ARR.IVAHNTENSITIES
    WheR agents rr}ove from one state to another state, they want to adjust
their positions. These represent arrivals of agents. Arriva}s are a}so due to
retail transactions. The arrivals of the agents are generated from four sltu-
at!ons. IR the following paragraphs we dlscuss in detail how ehe arrlvals are
generated in each situation. Suppose that Gt(x) shifted at epoch O and that
Gt(x) # fft(x), i.e., non-stationary heeerogeneity. For t > O, the sample of
FLE values consists of two groups; those drawn from before epoch O and those
drawn after epoch o. We use H(x) to denote a distributioB functioR for a sam-
ple of Xt which arrived before epoch ol aRd use G(x) to denote a distribntion
function for the other sample of xt which is drawn from the new Gt(x) after
epoch O.
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}i}rosted g}ass: When the ageRt !s in the state of frosted glass, he does not
assume aR open position. So each time the agent has a retail transaction, he
carries out a reverse transaction in the market. The agent is expected to sell fi2
(buy BD US dollars pey epoch to (from) his retail customers. So he !s expected
to buy P2 (sell Pi) US dollars per epoch iR the rnarket. There are ?v) agents
who are in the frosted state at a given epoch.
Transition 1 : In this transition, the agent leaves the frosted state and chooses
his xt from Gt(x) as showR in Figure 4. For a given set of the market rates
B(t) and A(t), ifthe agent's Xt is gyeater than A(t)+u, where u is a half
of the expected spread, then the agent becomes a buyer aRd hits A(t). Now
he has Iong posltlon and qttotes his selling price; taking actions (4 - 18). If the
agent's xt is smailer than B(t)-u, the agent becomes a buyer aitd hits B(t).
He has a short position aRd quotes his buying price; taking actions (4 - lg). If
the agent's Xt fal}s between B(t)-u and A(t)+u, then the agent quotes both
the buying aRd selling prlces; taking actions (4 - 20). The expected number of
agents per epech who have Transaction i is given by eiE[Nf]. 1- Gt(a) of
them hit A(t) aRd Gt(b) of them hit Bt(x), where a =- A(t)+u and b iEi B(t)- u.
Crystal glass: The agent has been qaoting hls price or prices. The agent muse
have adjusted his positioR according to his Xt. Unless Xt fa}ls in the iRterval
betweeR b and a, the desired positioR is the maxiinttm open position. The
values of the Xt's of £he agents who are in the crystal glass have distributioR
ftmction Ht(x). Among the agents ifi the crystal glass, Ht(b) of them have
the short positioBs and 1- Ht(a) of them have long positioits. Their dayllght
limits are binding. Each one ofthem is expected to sei} B2 (buy Bi) US dollars
per epoch to (from) the }'etai} ckistomers. If his actkia} position deviates from
the desired position due to the arriva} of retail customers, he hi£s one of the
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market rates in order to adjust his positioR promptly. In this case, the agent's
policy is either rhi (4-17-a) or rh, (4-- 17-b). Ifthe agent's Xt fal}s between
b and a, his desired positionis equako his actual positien most of time. The
agent's policy is Ii.i2 (4-27-g),together with Irhi2 (4-17-d) which is app}iecl
when the daylight limit is violated. So if b< xt < a, then he does not trade in
the market each time he has the retail transaction, uAless the daylight limit
happens to be bindlng at that epoch.
Tiransition 2: Transition 2 means that the agent abandons his expectation and
wants to square his position. If he has a loRg (short) positioR when Transition
2 occurs, he becomes a seller (buyer) and hlts B(t) (A(t) ). The expected
number of agents per epoch who have Trapsition 2 is given by e2E[N,]. As
is shown in Figgre 5, amoRg the agents who are quo£ing their prices, Ht(b)
of them have short positions and wlll become buyers when TraRsitioR 2 takes
p}ace. And 1- fft(a) of them have }ong positions and will become sellers. If
Gt(x) and Ht(x) are not the same, £he sample of the agents iR the crystal state
cons!sts oftwo groups of xt's; those drawn from the old Gt(x), for t< O, and
those from new Gt(x), for t> O. The agents in both sarr}p}e gyoups may have
Transitlon 2. We have to derive the number of agents whose Xt had come from
the new Gt(x) and who already have had TraRsition 2. The expected number
ofsuch agents is given by fi,l?t2I+e, (1 -e-e2t). The expec£ed number ofthe agents
drawn frorr} the old Gt(x) ls given by {]t,-g¥¥+,N,e-e2t. 1- G(a) of the respective
sample group become sellers aRd G(b) of them become buyers.
    We want to derive the arriva} lntensities of buyers aBd sellers who hit the
given market rates. To simplify the calculation, make the followiRg assump-
tion:
    A(6 - 2): The cluaRtity of each arrival is unity.
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    Let H(x) denote "t(x) of before epoch O, aRd let G(x) denote the new
distribution function of Gt(x) after epoch O. Then, uslng the resu}ts of the
preceding paragraphs, the arrival inteftsity ef buyers who hit the offered rate
is giveR as a sum of the following terms.
    Frosted glass: B2E[N)] (6-1-a)
    Transition1:SiE[Nf}(1-G(a)):ee}{l3i-,e.",",(1-G(a)):l(1-G(a)) (6-1-b)
    ']i'ransition 2: e2E[Nb]{e-e2tH(b) + (1 - e-e2t)G(b)}                                                              (6 -1- c)
    Crystal glass: P2E[N,], (6-1-d)
where biiB(t)-u, aiiiA(t)+u and l=- lll,g3iX+e,･
    The arrival intensity of sel}ers who hit the bid rate is given as a sttm of
the fol}owing terms:
    Frosted glass: BiE[IVf] (6-2-a)
    TransitioR 1: eiE[Nf]G(b) :gt,-lil"1.,,G(b) =IG(b) (6-2-b)
    'Il]'ransitlon 2: e2EIAIb]{e-e2t(1 - H(a)) + (1 - e-e2t)( 1 - G(a) )}                                                              (6 -2- c)
    Cryst&l glass: 6iE[AT,]. (6-2-d)
    Let A.(Ab) be the ayriva} intens!ty of the agents who h!t the offered (bid)
rate. Each arrlva} intensky censists of two parts,
                   Aaii!Aal+Aa2 and .>Lb='Abl+Ab2,
Here, A.i represeRts t}}e arrlvals of buyers who hl£ the offeyed rate in orcler
to counteract their retail selling which changed their position from the desired
leve}; A.i is the sum of (6-1-a) and (6-2-d). A.2 represents the arrivals of
buyers who hit the offered rate Clue to heterogeneous expec£atioRs; A.2 is the
sum of (6 -1- b) and (6 -1- c). Ab represents the arrival IRtensity of sellers
who hit the bid r&te. Abi represeR£$ the arrivals ofsellers who hit the bid rate
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iR order to counteract their retail bllying which deviated their position from
the desired level; Abi is thesum of (6-2-a) and (6-2-d). Ab2 represents the
arrivals of sellers who hit the bid rate due to the heterogeneity of expectations.
Ab2 is the sum of (6 -2- b) and (6 -2- c).
    Substituting b, c and d of(6-1) and (6-2),and using e2E[N.] =l, we
obtain
       Aa : Aal +l{1 - G(a) + e-S2`H(b) + (l - e-e2t)G(b) },
                                                              (6 - 3)       Ab == Abi +l{G(b) +e-e2t(l - ff(a)) + (l - e-e?') (l - G(a))}.
         6.4. DERIVATIeN OF THE EXPECTED TIME PATH
    To derive the expected time path of the exchange rate, we need arrival
intensities of the ageRts who hit the bid and the offered rates. When the
arrival intensities are not equal, the exchange rate is expected to shift. There
are two sources shifting ehe exchaRge rate. [I]he first is unmatched arrivals
of aggrega£e retail deraand and supply. rl]he second soxirce is shifts of Gt(x)
which may be caused by the arrival of news or by adaptive expectations as a
response to a trend in the transaction price. The first cause may give rise to
the second cause. Here we do Rot consider this interaction ofthe two sources.
We consider the expected time path, depending on whether the heterogeneous
expectations are stationary, or whether aggregate retall demaRd meets supply.
    A(6 - 3): Each ageRt's daylight limit is equal to one transaction unit.
    A(6 - 4): Ht(x) and Gt(x) are not equal. (Heterogeneous expectations are
    non-stationary.)
    We coBtinuethe examp}e discussed iR SectioR 6.3. We neg}ect the bid-ask
spread. So let a= b and let x= a. Then,
         Aa == Aai -Fl{1 - (l;(x)+ erme2tH(x) -f- (l ha eme2t)G(x)}
          Ab : Abi +l{ G(x) -i- e-e2t(l - ff(x)) + (1 -eine2t) (1 - G(x))}
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    Suppose that during At, the exchange rate changes by Ax. The agents
whose expected FLE values fall in [x,x+ Ax] switch from bullish to bearish
or vice versa as the transaction price chaBges by Ax. These agents' poskions
switch frem long to short or vice versa and absorb 2 unlts of arrivals. There are
h(x)Ax of the agents who switch positions. It was assumed that Ht(x) = Gt(x)
until epoch O and that Gt(x) shifted at epoch 6. Durlng [S,t}, £he expected
number of agents who constitute a sample of "(t) decreased from E[N,] to
e-e2tE[N.]. Meanwhlle the expected number of agents who coAstltute a sample
drawn from G(t) increases fromOto (1-e-e2t)E[N,]. The expec£ed excess
arrivals of buyers in [O,t] is (A. - Ab)xttst. This excess of buyers is matched
by a change of positions by the quoting agents. These agents consist ofthose
from the sample of H(x) and those from G(x). Let h(x) and g(x) be
density functions of ff(x) and G(x) . Then, the expected number of these
agents is h(x)Ax and g(x)Ax, respectively. The quantky which each agent
absorbs by switchiRg from long to short positions is 2 unks. Using eclzialities
oit = eg¥¥, = E[N.], we obtaln
             (A. - Ab) At = te-e2t2h(x)Ax + tis (l - eMe2t)2g(x)Ax
                      = Zl {e-e2'h(x) + (1 - e-e2t)g(x)}Ax.
Therefox'e,
                  Ax Aa-Ab          rrt " {'}Sl {e e2th(x)+ (1-,-e2t)g(.)}' (6m4)
    A(6 - 5): Gt(x) and fft(x) aye uniform distributions.
    Combining A(6-4) and A(6-5), let G(x) == k, for x G [O,k], and
ll(x) :t"=ltLLLM, for xG[Tni,mi+kj. Substltuting G(x) and H(x) into the
formula for A. and Ab, we obtain
              Aa : )L.1 +l{i- :+eme2tX -kMl + (1 -e-e2t)III}
                 " Aal -Fl(1 - Z[ii!t-e-e2t)
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and             Ab=:Abl+l{ill+e-e't(l-X'kMl)-l-(i-e-e2t)f}
                :Abi +l(l -l- ZliLte-e2t)
}ilence, A. - Ab = A.i - .)tbi - 21"e-e2`. Substltuting this into (6 - 4) yields
                    21/L = k(.>L.i - Abi - 2i!ll!t-e-e2t) gl
                         ke           : !l9/3 (Aai - Abi) - mie2e-e2t.
We want to solve this differentia} equation. The answer is given by
                  x(t) : 4S/Z2 (Aai - Abi)t + mie-e2t + co.
Let x(o) == xo be aR initial condition. Then, co :xo - mi and
                x(t) :!IS/Z2 (Aai-Abi)t+mieme2t+xo-mi, (6-5)
where xo is the valtie of x when the shlft of Gt(x) happened. As t -> oo,
x(t) - xo - mi , provided that Aai :Abi ･
    A(6 - 4)': Gt(x) and "t(x) are the same distributions. (Expectations are
    heterogeneous but statlonary.)
Substitute mi :O into the above equation. Then,
                            ke.   X(t) == t/ (Aai-Abi)t+xo･ (6-6)
This holds only whi}e O < x(t) < k. When we assttme A(6 - 4)', a slope of the
expected time path is determlRed oR}y by the arrivals whlch are due to retall
transac£ions. [I]he arrivals due £o heterogeReous expectations do not have ait
infiuence in (6 - 6).
    If the heterogeneity of the expectations is stationary (i.e., Gt(x) = fft(x)),
then,accorclingto (6-3), A.-Ab depenclsentirelyon A.i-Abi, since Aa2 =
Ab2 =1- G(a) + G(b). ']]his meaRs that as long as aggregate retail demaRd and
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supply are expecte(l to be eqllal, i.e., A.i : Abi, the transaction price will
not move to the meaR value taken with respect to G(x). In other words, the
agents' expectat!ons do not determine a kind of stable equilibrium point. If
A.i = Abi, anywhere withln the sttpport of G(x) and ff(x), the transaction
price is expected to stay at the level at which the random arriva}s put it. It is
similar to a MartlRgale process for the following reason. When heterogeReous
expectations are stationary, the expected Rumber of entries into the crystal
state by 'Transltion 1 which hits the offered (bid) rate is l(1 - G(a)) (IG(b))
and the expected nttmber of exits from the crystal glass by Transition 2 wh!ch
hits the bid (offered) rate is also l(l- G(a)) (IG(b)). Forces of the same
magnkude affect bid and offered rates.
        6.5. TffE MARKET MAKER'S ePTIMAL QUOTATIONS
    Agents who quote both buyiitg and selliRg prices at the same time ln
order to take advaittage ofthe heterogeReous expectations of other agents are
called market makers. [I]heir policy is {r.i2 ifIZI S L ; rhi2 ifIZI > L}
((4 - 17 - g) and (4 - 17 - d)). if for a glveit expected FLE value xt, AR agent
becorfies a ix{arket maker, interval [xt - u,xt + u] overlaps with {B(t),A(t)].
The market maker waRts both of h!s quotat!ons to be hit by the same arrival
intenslty. Among the combinations of such quotations, he chooses the oRes
which maxlmize his expected profit.
    The value of u', which so}ves (4 - ls), maximizes the long run aveyage
expected profit. [['o derive (4-15), we treated the arrivai!nteRsity g of buyers
and also ofsellers as a functioft of u whlch is half ofthe bid-ask spread. In this
section, we derive an explicit form of q = f(u), ass£imiRg uniform distribution
for the expected FLE va}ue. It is possible that the agent w!ll choose P.i2 axxd
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become a market rnaker even if he is bullish or bearish in the sense of A(4 -g).
Such action may be profitable, if the arrival intensity is large enough compare
to the slope of c(t). However, we do not consider such a situatioit here.
    In order to derlve the arrival intensity, we coitsider which actions agents
will take given their expected FLE valttes. Suppose AgeRt O wants to determine
the arrival intensity for his quotations. Let xo be his expected FLE value aRd
2u be the bid-ask spread. Let A and B be Agent O's se}ling and buying
prices such that A= xo+u and B == xo-u. As u becomes larger, the number
of competitors whose quotations fall iR interval [B, A] wil} increase. In order
to calculate the expected number of competitors we assume the fo}lowing.
    A(6 - 6): All ageRts have the same bid-ask spread.
    Besides Agent O, any ageRts whose FLE va}ues happen to fall around the
current market rates would quote the buyiRg and sel}lng prices with the same
spread, provided that their daylight limlts are not binding. In additioR to
A(6 - 6), we assume A(6 - 3), A(6 - 4)' aRd A(6 - 5) in the fo}lowing.
    Let a=-A+u and b=-B-u. ']]hesupports of G and H are divided
into six Tegions as is shown iR FIgure 6. Let x be the expected FLE value of
agiven agent. Since the bid-ask sp:ead !s 2u for every agent, x ==a is the
miRimum valv{e of x, such that the bkiying price x - u is greater or equal to
AgeBt O's selliRg prlce, A. Among £he agents who are arriving with x drawn
from G(x), thosein region S6 which cons£itute 1-G(a) ofthe arrivals hlttiAg
A. If x E Ss, then the arrivals quote the buying prices which fa}l iRto S4. If
x G S4, then the buyirLg prices fall into S3. If x E S3, then the selling prices
fa}} into S4. If x E S2, then t}i{e selling prices fall into S3 . Selling prices
xE S2 are lowerthaR buy!ng prices xE Ss, cancelllng each other. If x EI Si,
then £he arrivals hit B. The expected number of arrivals of those drawn from
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G is eiE[Nf]. This is the per-epoch expected number of agents who have
Transition 1 and it can be writtelt as eiE[Nf] = k,kSX+eN, == l. Among the arrivals,
(1-G(a))l ofthem hit A and (G(xo)-G(B))l block A.
    Next we consider effects of prices which have been quoted. Their asso-
ciated FLE values aye dlstributed according to H. If x G S6, then agents
have long positioits, and their selling prices are less competitive than A. If
x E Ss, then the bttyiRg prices fall into S4. Meanwhile, if x G S2, then selling
prices fall into S3. It is impossible to have a sample of quotations such that
the quoted buying prices quoted are higher than the selling prices. Therefore,
selling prices x E S2 must have cancelled biaying prices x E Ss and thus are
not blocking A. If xE S4, then buying prices fall into S3. If xE S3, then
selling prices fall into S4 and do not caRcel the buyiBg prices x E S4. Bttying
prices xES3 block A.
    AgeRts who are quoting prlces are in the state of the crysta} glass. [rheir
expected Rumber ls E[ N,] = zfgf¥in+¥, = ge. [I]he expected number of ageRts with
xES3, blocking A, is given by (H(xo)-H(B))".. Meanwhile, e2E(N.] of
the ageRts are expected to have ']]raRsltion 2, discarding their expectations,
and to square thelr positions. AmoRg tkese agents, ff(xo) ofthem have short
positions and become buyers when they have Transltlon 2. The expected
number of buyers who hit A is giveR by H(xo)e2E[Nc]= H(xo)l.
    The daylight limits are binding for the agents who coRstitute the sample
fer ff . If due to retail transactions their posltions deviate from the daylight
liraits, they bring the positioR to the origlnal level by hittiRg market rates.
Aggregate retail transactions become the arrivals at the market right away.
"Irhe arrival intensity in this case is Aai･
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    Combiningthe preceding discussion, (1-G(a))l+H(xo)l+A.i hit A and
(G(xo)-G(B))l+(H(xo)-H(B))zix block A. Let g== f(u) bethe arrival
iRtensity of agents who hit A as a function of u.
   f(u) = (1 - G(a))i+ ff(xe)i + Aai - (G(xo) - G(B))i- (H(xo) - H(B)) zi.T
Let G(x)= ff(x) =f. Then, 1-G(a) ==1-EESZI';:liL, H(xe) :E8 and G(xo)-
G(B)= H(xo)- H(B)= X. By substituting ehese into f(u), we obtaiR
                      f(u) == l+ Aai '- £(3+ til.r )u (6-7)
The necessary condl£ion for the long run average expected profit maximization
accordlng to (4- 15) is f'u+f = O. Substituting (6 -7) into (4 -15), we obtain
                       u"= ll 3e,e2+1(l -t- Alai). (6Hs)
The optlmal spread is 2u', and Agent O, whose expected FLE value is xo,
will quote A=xo+u' and B=xo-u'.
                   6.6. AGENT,S !NFORMATION
    The exchange ra£e is determined through the arrival process of agents.
The parameters of this process are determiRed by aggregate retail demand and
sttpp}y, ARD(t) and ARS(t), and the FLE distribution functions,Ht(x) aitd Gt(x).
Agents estimate ARP(t), ARS(t), fft(x), and Gt(x). which are all nonstationary.
The agents estimate these parameters with varyiRg degrees of accuracy. Since
ARD(t) and ARS(t) depend on the individual agents' retall customers, no agent
can estimate ARD(t) and ARS(t) accurately all the time. The market is not
eff}cient as is discussed in Levich (1985).
74
7. PROPOSITIONS ABOUT VOLATILITY AND TRADING VOLUME
Proposition 1.
             As Var[X(t)]increases, E[A(t)- B(t)]lncreases.
(The more people dlsagree, tke wider becomes the bid and ask spread.)
Proof: We prove the propositlon with the fo}lowing assttmptions: A(6 - 4)',
A(6 - 5) aRd A(6 - 6). A}so, we need one more assumption:
    A(7 - l): All ageRts make the same estimate about the var!ance of Gt(x)
    and ff,(x) aRd E[Are].
    In Chapter 6, the optimal spread 2u' is derived with the assumption
that the agents wou}d have the same spread when they quote both buyiRg and
sel}ing prlces. We need A(7 - l) iit order for (6 - 8), the formula foer u', to
be conslstent with A(6 - 6) with whlch the derivation of (6 - 8) is started. Let
G(x)= ff(x) == k aRd a2 bea variaRce of Xt. ']]hen, ff2 == l}÷?. Forthesake of
s!mplifying the calctilatioB, we shifted the support of the distribut!on functions
to [O,k]. We considey three types of rnarket-rates quotes. The first ls when
on}y oite rnarket maker quotes both bid and offered rates. The second is wheR
more than one market maker is quoting. Market rates consist of quota£ions
of the dlffereRt market makers. The third is when no agent is quotlng £wo
rates. We want to show in all three cases that E[A(t)-B(t)] increases as
a2iRcreases. Instead ofwyitingthe optimalspread as 2u', let v' ii! 2u'. From
(6 - 8),
                        v" =k3s.-e2+ 1 (l + 6f.Ell ).
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    Case1:Wewanttoshowthat gl'S>O.Since {l;'iiL,'=sz,g{#r,",(1+AfX)>O
and ilS'T=12>O, '                          0v' Sv'0k                          Oa2=ok ea2>O' (7-1)
                                 ttt
    Case 2: Suppose that the first market maker quotes (Bi,Ai) = (x - GIiL,x+
V), as his bllying and selling prices, that the second market makey jeins the
fust market maker quoting (B2,A2) = (y- 31;,y+ SS ), and that their quotations
overlap. If their quotatioRs overlap, then Bi S A2 and B2 S Ai･ I[{ence,
x- Sli!- =Bi S A2 =y+ il5 aRd y- ill- :B2 s Ai :x+ il;. Fixing x, the density
function of y, coRditioRal on that [Bi,Ai] and [B2,A2] overlap,!s given by
di. :-.., provided v'sxsk-v',becauseycantake value from x-v" to x+v'.
Within this range, ifthe value ofy is sttch that x-v' -< ysx,then A(t)= A2
and B(t) == Bi. The offered rate is quoted by the second market maker, the bid
rate is quoted by the fust market maker, and A(t)-B(t) = A2-Bi = y-x+v". If
x-<ysx+v', then A(t) :Ai, B(t)=B2 and A(t)-B(t)=Ai-B2-- -y+x+v'.
Pyovided that v* s x s k - v', the expected spread is given by
      E[A(t) - B(t)] : y(IZ..( y - x + v')2i. dy + Y(IX'"'(-y + x + v')2i. dy
                    v*                   =-        .2
If x s v', and ifthe quotations over}ap,it must bethe case that o s y s x+v',
because y-SS =B2sAi==x+31Y mttsthold. If O-<ySx,then A(t)==A2
and B(t)= Bi. If xSySx+vx,then A(t)=Ai and B(t) :B2. Thedensity
function of y, condit!onal on their quotatlon overlap, is given by .+i... The
expected bid-ask spread, for x s v', is glveR by
     E[A(t) m B(t)] .. ygx( y nv . + .*). t ,. dy + ylx+v'(hay + . + .*). +1 .. dy
                   x+v' x
                    2 x+v*
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Using the above result, we have m9.r(ESse: -.+X..) :g+ tw >o. Hence, for
two cases of v"SxSk-v' and xSv", using (7-1), silr(E{A(t)-B(t)]) =
s9.;-.(E[A(t)-B(t)])gi'S > O. If x ) k-v' and the quotations overlap, then,
similariy, s2T-(E[A(t)-B(t)])>O.
    If there are more than two market makers who are quoting, then we have
the same result by the similar derivation.
    Case 3: No agent is quoting both bid and offered rates at the same
time. And the bid and ask spread in the market is wider than v'. If an
agent's FLE is x,then his bid rate is x- 31; and his offered rate is x+ Gli.
Since asupport of G(x) and H(x) is [O,k], the bid (offered)rate is dis-
tributed over [-i2",k-g8] ([ ig,k÷gS]). If ehere is no quotation in a
givenlnterval, [xo,xi], for -VsxoSk-{ and fSxiSk+f, any
quoted price must fall outside of [xe,xi]. Together with A(6- 5), it implies
that if any agent is quoting price, his expected FLE value x must satisfy
the following inequality. x- 31i s xe or xi sx-F if. No ageRt's expected
FLE valtte x stays in aR interval [xe+G2;,xi-iS]. Let w ff! xi-xo-v';
the length of lhe interval where nobody's expected FLE value x is located,
when no pylce ls quoted in [xo,xi]. Then the length of the interval where
nobody's quotation is located is w+v'. Let wo be an event which is ex-
pressed as intersections of three events, { No ageRt ls quoting both rates. }A
{m agents are quoting their prices. }n{A(t)-B(t) = w+v'}. Event wo is ecluiv-
alent to { No one's x is located in the interval of length w when m agents are
qlioting their prlces. }. Hence, the probability of eveRt wo is given by
                         Pr(wo)=(1-1)M. (7-2)
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We approximate (7 - 2) by Taylor's expansion. Let f(W) = (1 - W)M. Then,
                    f(W)fUf(O)+f'(O)W+f"SO)(iiil)2
                        -i+ .W + M(M,- i) (W)2
Let ylle W. rl?hen osys1 aRd w= ky. Given that m agents are quotiRg, but
that none of them is a market maker, the expected value of the bid-ask spread
is given by
           E[A(t) - B(t)] rm ./['(ky + v')f(y) dy
                        :,1[i(ky+v"){1+my+M(M2'1)y2}dy
                       = liltT(3m2 +sm + 12) + lii.(.2 +2. + 6).
For any m, 3m2+5m+12>O and m2+2m+6>O. LFrom the result ofthe
first case, {li'f-,' > O. We obtain ?iltrE[A(t) - B(t)] > e. [I]herefore in all three cases,
b9zi¥E[A(t) - B(t)] > O. Q.E.D.
Proposkion 2.
               As Var[X(t)]increases, Var[S(t)] increases.
pz･eof: Arrivals of agents aye geRerated by two causes; heteyogeiteity of ex-
pectations and retail transactions. In oyder to prove the Propositioft 2, we
have to distingulsh arrlvals due to two causes. We define three variables,
aggregate heterogeneity transactioits, aggregate retail transactioRs and aggre-
gate excess demand. A definltion of aggregate heterogeneity transactions is
cumulative quaRt2ty which the offered rate was hit mlnus cumulative quaRtity
which the bid rate was hit by those who arrived due to heterogeneous ex-
pectations. Let AH(t) denote aggregate heterogeReity transactions at epoch
t. Its expected valtie is given by E[AH(t)l = (A.2-Ab2)t. If A(6-4) is as-
skimed, then by (6-7), A.2 = Ab2, and hence, E[Aff(t)] = O. SecoRcl, we
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define aggregate retail transactions. Aggregate retaiZ transactions are excess
of aggregate cumulative retail selling over aggregate cumulative retail buying.
Let ARD(t), ARS(t) and AR(t) denoteaggregateretailselling,aggregate
retail buying and aggregate retail transactions at epoch t, respectively. By
definition, AR(t) !ii ARD(t) - ARS(t) and E[AR(t)] = (A.i - Abi)t. '[ihirdly, we
define excess demand at epoch t, ED(t), such that ED(t)ii! AR(t)÷AH(t).
    We ttse the same assumptions as in Proposkion 1 and one more assump-
tioa.
    A(7-2): Aggregate retail demaitd and supply have the same arrival rates,
    Aal :Abl･
Suppose that the aggregate excess demand equals q at epoch t, ED(t) =g
and that, initially, AR(e) =O alld S(O) = so. Let W iEi S(t)-E[S(t)],
then Var[W] = VarfS(t)]. The differeitce in the arrivals of buyers and selleys
is absorbed by ageRts who switch their positions. ']]he FLE values of these
agents have distributioR Ht(x). To simplify the pTeof, let us suppose that the
agents' FLE va}ues ane deterministically distributed according to fft(x). For
given g, and m the number of agents quoting their prices, there is a value for
w, denoted by w, which satisfies
                         q=2J4gy+"Oh(u)dum. (7-3)
(7 - 3) implies that excess aggregate retail demaRd is absorbed by the agents
who sw!tched their positions, for examp}e, from short to loBg if g > o, and
that the RurRber ofthose agents are .f;g+"e h(u)du percent of m. Wieh A(6-s),
(7-3) becomes g= 2(ll(zv+so)-H(so))m=2!{if'iL.HeRce, w= si.Fq holds aRd
                                k                           W == lii;.ffED(t).
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ED(t) is a sum of the four compound Poisson processes. We assume all four
arrival processes are Poisson processes in order to simplify the proof,i3 instead
of assuming compound Poisson.i4 Then,
          E[ED(t)l= (A.-Ab)t and Var[ED(t)]la-(A.+Ab)t.
Since W= tiI.FED(t),
                      var[;ty]= (+.)2var[ED(t)]. (7-4)
Neglecting the bid-ask spread, from (6 - 3), we have
                    Ab=Abi+l and Aa=Aai+l, (7-5)
wherel : {l},kti¥+,N,. I{ence, Var[AR(t)] does not depend on the heterogeneity of
expectations. i.e., not depending k, the parameter of the FLE distrlbution.
Hence, atrk}5tgeZl = s#;z;var[ED(t)] > O. 'Iiherefore, OV"er.S t) = mpt ljllt8T > o.
Q.E D.
    According to ex!sting theories, during a so-called "tEtrbulen£ era," wheB
var[S(t)] is larger, the bid-ask spread is widened in order to compensate market
makers who still stand ready to trade with other ageRts. CoRtrary to these
theories, in our modei the wlder bid-ask spread during a volatile period is ltot
diie to compensations for market makers to take addltional risks. What makes
the spread wider is the degree of disagreement among the agents.
Proposition 3.
           Var[S(t)]increases, as NiO (effect ofthin market).
    i3To obtain the expected valzies ofthe compound PoissoR process, mtt}-
tiply Ab and A. by theexpected valLie ofthe individual retail trallsac£ion,E[C]. The variaRce is given by {Var[C]+ E[C]2}(A. +Ab).
    i4They are all imcorrelated by assumptlon.
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proof: We ttse the same assurnptions as Propositions 1 and 2. Se far m is an
arbitrary positive integer. Here, let m denote an expected number of agents
who are quoting. From (7-5), Ab = Abi+l =Abi+e2m aRd Aa = Aai+l =Aai+e2m,
where miii E[AZ}]= ij:,;Slg;+e,?V. And Var[AR(t)] :Ab+Aa :Abi+A.i+2S2m. We
differentiate (7-4) with respect to m, to obtain
             0Vaor£IW] = - 2k,.',var[AR(t)] + ( 3S.ir )20Var8A,.R(t)]
                                       k2e.k2                     = -2.3(Aai + Abi) + 2m2"
                     = 2tt3{-(Aai -I- AbD + me2}.
If Aai+Abi >me2,orequivalently, if A.i+Abi >l= gf,gX)f+eN,, then gutV .W <o.
    Because OVao'NS(t) = eYg?.li!2t2git- and gft<-t >o,thevarianceofthetransaction
price increases, as £he number of the agents decreases from m = i;(Aai + Abi)･
If m > Sl(Aai +Abi), then the variance of the transaction price increases as the
Rumber of the ageRts increases. Q. E. D.
    In the fust case above, as the number of market participaRts becomes
smaller, the variance of the transaction prices increases. This is an effect of
thin markets. For a given Ht(x), as N increases from o, a larger number of
agents are wakiRg behind the market rates A(t) alld B(t). Therefore, jumps
of S(t), caused by batch arrivals of buyers and sellers, tend to be smaller.
HeRce the fiuctuation of S(t) becomes smaller. }Iowever, after N reaches
(Aai + Abi) eei,+ee,2>, an iRcrease in N resglts in further fluctRation of S(t). An
increase in N increases A.2 and Ab2. Since the variance of the number of
arrivals of the Polsson Process is equal to its expected value, the variance
iRcreases as the arriva} iRtensities increase. As the variaRce of the arrival
number increases, S(t) fluc£uates more. This is a destabiliziRg effect of an
iBcrease in the number of ageBts. ]For IV > (A.i +Abi)(ei+ee,2>, the destabilizing
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effect of AN dominates the stabiliziRg effect which absorbs moye of the
variation in AR(t).
proposition 4.When Var[S(t)] is large, the expected value of tradiRg volume is
also large.
    proof: Let TV(T) be the trading volume of the day. The expected trading
volume is equal to max{A.T ,AbT}.i5 Since the arrival processes are piece-
wise stationary, the aryival intenslties defined for an entire day are weighted
averages ofthe arrival inteRsities which constitute piece-wise stationarity. The
weights are the lengths of each stationary period divided by T. Excess demaRd
wasdefined as ED(t)=-AR(t)+AH(t). Weinterpret EP(t) as ED(t)-=
AD(t)- AS(t). Then with A(6 - 4)' and A(7 - 2), E[AD(t)] : E[AS(t)] = A.t.
From (7-s), Ai --- Aii+l for i-- a,b, where l= de{+,,N･ Since zX,r' = Sf2+)i,X >O
and zSitft >o, wehave g2tf, >O and g2tt, >O, for i--a,b. Then,
              OE[TV(t)] 0E[TV(t)]OA,･01 (e2)21V                 0ei = aA,･ olaei=(e,+e,)2t>O,
where Aj -- max{A.,Ab}. The expected trading volume increases as ei and e2
increase. By (7 - 5) and (7 - 4), the variance of S(t) increases as Ai, i -- a,b,
increases. And we know gS/f` > O, for i-- a,b. Therefore, va:[S(t)] and the
trading volume increase together as ei and e2, or both increase. Q.E.D.
    When the variance of Xt is larger, the agents revise theiy expectation
more frequently. This frequent revision means that ei aRd e2 aye larger. It
implies that the number of times wheR the transitions between the two states
of expectations occur is larger. For a given fft(x) , the arrival iRtensities Ab and
A, become larger and the trading vo}ume becomes larger.
    i5 Difference (A. - Ab)T is filled by net aggregate open positioRs during
the buslness day aRd elther by flow to or from the markets abroad or by the
loan market at the end of the business day.
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    If we introduce the additional assumption that Var[X(t)] is larger when ei
and e2 are larger, then Proposition 4 has an additional sttpportive argument:
When big news hits the market, not only the mean value of Xt shifts, but also
var(xt) increases. This is because even if all the agents agree on the direction
ofthe price shift, they do not agree on the exact quantitative effect of the news.
When the degree of disagreemeRt increases due to the big news, agents tend to
revise their expectations more frequently. As agents revise their expectations
more often, they adjust their position ritore frequently. The trading volume
increases.
    Another arg"mentto support PropositioR 4 is possible if weintroduce aR
adaptive expectation which associates shifts of Gt(x) with the movements of
the transaction price. Suppose that if the agen£s are more uncertain about the
trend of the exchange rate, iRdividual agents tend to revise their expectatioRs
more frequently, i.e., larger ei and e2, and that in sttch periods, the variance
of Xt is larger. When S(t) moves due to the unmatched arrival of agents,
the change in S(t) will be faster as ei becomes larger, because the number of
TraRsition 1 of expectations for a given interval of time is }arger for larger ei.
For a given r, which is a length of time dur!ng which the moving average is
taken, a given change in S(t) has more effect on the autoregressive terms, which
cause the shift of Gt(x). Therefore, if expectations are revlsed more frequently,
Gt(x) shifts more frequently. Dtte to the more frequeRt shifts of Gt(x) when
the variance of Xt is larger, the exchaRge rate is more volatile. Thus, the
increased volati}ity of the exchange ra£e and a wider bid-ask spread c'an occur
at the same time.
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    However, Propositions 1 to 4 together will explain the reasoR why, in
contrast to the equity market, empirical researches fail to show a clear pos-
itive relationship between price volatility and tradiRg volume in the foreign
exchange market.i6 Distribution functions Ht(x) have different values for their
variances. The trading volume increases by increases in Aa, Ab or both. A,
and Ab coRsist of two parts. One represents arrivals originated iR the ag-
gregate retail transactions aRd the other represents arrivals generated by the
heterogeneity of expectations. The aggregate retail transactions may vary,
whi}e var{xt] is determined separately. It is possib}e that on a given day, A.i
and Abi are larger than tkeir dai}y averages while var[Xt] is smalleer than its
daily average. Had ehis situation occurred, theR Var[S(t)] wouid be smaller
thanits daily average, while the tradlng volume would be higher thanits dally
average. If Var{Xt] is smaller while A.i aRd Abi are larger, Var[S(t)] may stay
the same or even sma}ler, while the trading volume is higher.
    In the equity market,i7 on the contrary if A., or Ab increase, then
almost all of increments coitsist of arrivals due to the heterogeneity of the
expectations. ei and e2 are larger aRd Var[Xt] is larger atthesame time.
Therefore, in the equity market an increase in the tradiRg volume is always
accompanied by an increase in Var[S(t)].
    '6Details are discussed in the introdttction.
    i'The equity market is a retail market, while the foreign exchange market
is awholesale market. Interpreta£ion of A.i aRd Abi fortheequity market isarrivals of orclers generatecl by liquidlty purpose by the public. A.2 and Ab2
are generated by revisions of the expected seock prices by the public.
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PART 3.
APPENDIX
                     A. SWAP TRANSACTIONS
    Swap in foreign exchange markets means you trade all at once the for-
eign currency of two different delivery dates with tradlng of one delivery date
reversing the other. Most swap traRsactioRs consist of either buyiRg the spot
and selling the forward or selliRg the spot and buying the forward. Some
swap transactions consist of other corr}biRations of delivery dates, including
today-tomorrow, toiy}orrow-spot,i and forward-forward.
    As an exaix}ple of a swap transaction, you may sell spoe US dollars agalnst
other czirrency and buy forward US dollars atthesame time. Thls transaction
can be thought to be a repurchase agreemeRt of a curtency or a loan of one
currency with the othey currency as a collateral. You have the other currency
instead of US dollars uRti1 the dzie date of the forward delivery. You may
make a loan in the other currency. On the de}ivery date of the forward, you
receive the principal and the interest on the loan. You ttse that principal to
complete the swap traRsaction. You deliver the other curreRcy and receive US
dol}ars. The forward rate and the relevant interest rate are known when you
    iDe}ivery of the spot currency ls two buslness days after a contract.
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make the swap tTansactioR, except for the spot rate which may be applied on
the interest from the loan. The market makers' profits are determined today
and the profits are rea}ized on the delivery dates of the forward. The market
makers of swap transactiens are not exposed to aRy exchange risks, They only
take default risks. The default risk of banks is practically negligible. The
market makers stand yeady to trade at their quotations without taking into
accottnt of the expectation of the future spot rate.
        B. POISSON AND COMPOUND POISSeN PReCESSES
                    B.1. POISSON PR.OCESSES
    A stochastic process {N(t),t > o} is said to be a counting process if N(t)
represents the total number of events that have occurred up to epoch t. A
couRting process is said to possess independeRt increments if the number of
events that occurin disjoint time !Rtervals are lndepeRdent. A couRting process
is said to possess stationary lncrements if the distributlon of the n"mber of
events that occur duriRg aRy interval of time depends only on the length of
the time interva}. The countiRg process {N(t),t > e} is said to be a Poisson
process having rate A, A > O, if
  ( i) N(O) =O.
  ( ii) The process has !ndependent increments.
  ( iii) The number of events in any intervai of length t is Poisson distributed
    with mean At. In thls paper, we call this A an arriva} intensity as in
    queueing theory.
              B.2. COMPOUND POISSON PROCESSES
    A compound Poisson process meaRs that ehe number of the arrival is
a Poisson process and that each arrival has its quantity. An example of a
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compound Poisson process is cumulative insurance payments. Let N(to) be
the numbe: of inszirance claims duriRg aR [e,to]. N(te) is a random variable
and N(to) fbllows a Poisson distribution with an arrival intensity a. It implies
E(N(to)] : ate. The expected number of arriva}s is proportionate to the length
of tirne. Let Xi be an amount of the Sth insurance claim which as filed with an
insurance company during the interval [O,to]. A seqeeRce of random variables
{Xi} are assumed to be indepegdently aitd identlcally distributed. Let y
be the cumttlative amount of the insurance claims for the period of (O,to];
Y=Xi+X2+X3+･･･+XN. Ifweassume Xi aRd N(to) areindependent,
Y followsthe compound Poisson process. SiRce E[N(to)]= ato,the E[Y] is
given by
                       E[Y]=: E[Xi]E[Ai'(to)]
                            = cttoE[Xil
    The expected va}ues of cumulative retail transactions in our rr}odel are
derived in an !clentical manRer. Since the arrival process is Poisson, the ex-
pected values of Ri and R2 are proportionate to the length of the iRterval.
Let's take an example of inteyval [e,to]. Assuming Ri(e) = R2(O) = O,
           E[Ri(te)]=aitoE[X] aRd E[R2(to)]=ct2toE[X]
where ai is an arrival in£ensity of retail sellers, a2 ls an arrival intensity of
retail buyers, and X is a quantity demanded or supplied by each retail arrival.
    The retall traRsactions betweeR epoch te and T are givek by R2(T) - R2(to)
&nd Ri(T) - Ri(to). Their expected valges &re proportiofiate to the length of
time of this interval, T-to. Let 6i = aiE[X], for i--w-: 1,2. TheR the expected
value is written as
               E[Ri(T)-Ri(to)]=6i(T-to) for iin-1,2.
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Figure 1. a Glance at the Market (Continued)
  3. Agent3 declared his selling price Ai to the broker. The broker announce
    Ai which is the minimum of the quoted seilin.cr price to all the agents.
    The quotation is aRonymous.
  4. Agent4 shouts "Ai is taken." He buys at Ai which has been quoted fov a
    while.
  5. Agent4 finds ait ideRtity of the seller who is Agent3. US dollars are
delivered by Agent3 to AgeRt4 two days later.
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    An ageRt maximizes the expected profit of each monotone subperiod: l.
buy at S(to); 2. sell at6(ti); 3. buy at6(t2); 4. sell at6(T). The maximization
over an eRtire interval Cti,Tl is obtained by suclt successive maximizations in
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    FIgure 4. Distrlbution of rt of New Arrlvals
    Gt(x) is a distributions function such that when transitlon } occurs with
a givelt agent, the value of zt i$ random d!awiRg witk this distiribution. Let
a=-A(t)+u, byB(t)-u where 2te istheexpected bid-askspread. If .x<b,
then an ageRt will hit the bid rate B(t) upon arrival, since the agent is bearish
in a similar sense ofA(4- 9). C[ihen the ageltt quotes xti -u as his buying
price. If X > a, then the agent will hit the offered rate .4(t) upon arrival,
since the agent is buthsh in a sense ofA(4- 9). Then the agent quotes xti --l-u
as his selling price.
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    FSgure 5. I)istribution of Sampie xt
    Ht(=)is asample disttibution of xt. Ai and Bi are selling and buying prices
being quoted by the agents whose FLE are xti and xtj. Let a su A(t)÷u,
bur B(t)-u where 2u is the expected bid and ask spread. Since A{ =xt{ ÷u
ancl Bi :xti･ -u, the quotatioRs are distributed over the Nvider range than
the support of fft(x). If X < b, then aR agent is bearish in a similar sense
of A(4- 9). He mttst have sold US dollars upon anival and he is currently
assumiRg a short positioR. The agent will become a buyer when transition 2
of his expectation occurs. If X > a, then the agent is buliish in a sense of
A(`1 - 9). He must have bought US dollars upon arrival and currently he is
assurne a long position. He will become a setter xvheR transition 2 occurs.
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    Figure 5. Distribution ofSample xt (coRtiRued)
    If the heterogeneous ercpectations are stationary, i.e., (Gt(x) = fft/L--･)),
then the arrival intensity of the new aErivals who hit the offered (bid) rate is
equal to the intenslty of the a.crents who are leaviR.a the crystal g}as$ and hit
the bid (offered) rate. As a result, like a Maurtingale process, the transaction
price is expected to stay at the locatioR wl}ere the raRdom arrivals put it.
The tramsaction price does not conver.cre to the mean vaiue of FLE taken with
respect to Ht (x) and Ct(=). This result does not depend on the shape of H, (x)
and Ct(x).
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